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INTRODUCTION 
 
Social issues such as Corporate Sustainability and gender parity are among the most relevant 
imperatives that twenty-first century economic actors are globally facing. These concepts have 
been subjected to numerous analyses and studies, aiming both to provide them univocal defini-
tions and to identify the effects – whether positive or negative – of their pursuing.   
Regardless of the reasons that may lead firms to operate responsibly, Corporate Sustainability 
is generally perceived as source of both costs and benefits: whether benefits are sufficient to 
outweigh costs has to be ascertained case by case. The wide and unmatching literature over 
sustainability is a proof of what just stated, as the consequences that ethical behaviors have on 
companies are not completely transparent. This is the reason why it is worthless to say a priori 
that sustainability is always the right path to choose, contrarywise each company has to consider 
the context in which it competes and the internal resources it possesses before making any 
reckless decision about responsible behaviors.    
The possibility to pursue Corporate Sustainability is thus contingent to some preconditions 
which need to be fulfilled, connected both to corporate features and to leader’s traits and values. 
The wide literature over company’s size, resources and performance linked to sustainability 
have induced recent studies to focus more on the leadership part, trying to identify those 
leader’s demographic characteristics – as well as skills and values – that may strengthen or limit 
environmental and social responsibility. Leader’s traits can be considered from an individual 
point of view, analyzing the influence of CEO’s values over corporate actions, and from a col-
lective point of view, taking into account how such individual features interact with the 
individual characteristics of other members of the Board of Directors. Demographic and behav-
ioral differences within such committee are related to a wide range of positive organizational 
outcomes, which goes from the improvement of firms’ social and economic performance to the 
superior Boards’ decision-making process.   
Among the several leader’s individual characteristics, gender is the one most discussed in lit-
erature, as it embodies the main challenge faced by modern corporations. On this note, gender 
parity and the related women representation on Boards have been recently perceived as a mantra 
for companies, which need to be fulfilled in order to satisfy the pressures coming both from 
internal and external stakeholders. However, gender discrimination is not only a claim which 
has to be satisfied, but it’s a pathway that companies have to undertake to thrive and prosper in 
the competitive arena. This is because female directors entail several benefits for organizations, 
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from the positive effects over economic and financial performance toward the favorable condi-
tions over sustainability.  
As the literature has already exhaustively analyzed the connection between women representa-
tion and economic performance, in this dissertation the focus on the beneficial effects of female 
directors over the ethical side was considered more valuable. Especially in recent years, numer-
ous researches tried to identify the relation which lies between women and sustainability, 
without finding an unambiguous outcome. In the face of the doubtful literature over such topic, 
the study here performed has been developed to test the effective link between women repre-
sentation and sustainable behaviors, with the aim of validating or denying the assertions already 
highlighted by scholars.  
The first Chapter introduces the general framework of Corporate Sustainability, focusing on 
the main reasons that drive firms to behave responsibly and examining the costs and benefits 
associated to its proper implementation. Moreover, the final paragraph depicts the organiza-
tional and individual factors that favor the spread of sustainability within businesses.  
Chapter 2 focuses on leader’s influence over Corporate Sustainability, with the aim of identi-
fying those individual traits and behaviors that positively impact sustainable policies. It explains 
also how such individual features influence the functioning of the Board of Directors, as its 
composition affect the way in which it operates. Further considerations are then made about the 
most discussed demographic characteristics of leaders, the gender, analyzing the positive ef-
fects of women representation over economic, financial, and ethical performances. At the end 
of the Chapter, the research questions underlying the dissertation are justified and described. 
The study wants to test the relation between women representation and sustainability (H1), 
understanding whether this effect is more positive on the social rather on the environmental 
side (H2), and identifying how results change when the women is not simply a director, but the 
CEO (H3).  
Chapter 3 describes the methodology employed to test the three research questions. First of all, 
it explains the selected sample, the way in which data have been collected and the structure of 
the questionnaire used. Moreover, the Chapter outlines the empirical models developed for the 
study, explaining the dependent, independent and control variables considered and the reason-
ing behind their choice. Lastly, it ends with the description of the sample composition.  
The Chapter is divided into two steps of analysis, which aim to test two different sides of sus-
tainability. The first step refers to a generic analysis performed to have a global overview over 
the link between women representation and the sustainability propensity of firms, intended as 
their willingness to engage in responsible policies. The second step goes deeper into the issue 
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and tries to identify whether women representation affects not only the propensity of firms to 
be sustainable, but also the level with which they commit to sustainability, thus their sustaina-
bility intensity. 
The analyses are developed employing two concepts for identifying sustainable firms, namely 
the B Corp Certification, released by the B Lab, and the Benefit legal form: sustainable firms 
are intended those companies that get the Certification and/or to which is recognized the Benefit 
legal form. Moreover, to measure the level of sustainability of firms, the B Impact Scores are 
employed, which are likewise released by the B Lab. Such scores measure the effects that a 
business has on all of its stakeholders, and are divided into several impacts area, that range from 
the social to the environmental side of sustainability. On the other hand, two different proxies 
for women representation are used: the presence or absence of women in corporate Boards and 
the gender of the CEO. The two proxies are employed alternatively in the models, mainly to 
understand whether there are differences in the sustainable outcomes on the basis of the power 
position of the woman, but also to verify the hypothesis for which the relation between female 
representation and sustainability is stronger when the CEO is a woman.  
Chapter 4 starts showing how the samples differ when considering the presence or absence of 
female directors and the gender of the CEO, then testing if such differences are statistically 
significant. Subsequently, the results that come from the application of the regression models 
and of the T-tests are discussed, considering their impacts over the research questions devel-
oped. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the most relevant results, considering the managerial implica-
tions of the findings and comparing them to the outcomes of the theoretical framework already 
developed. The Chapter ends by identifying the main limits to the study, while providing some 
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CHAPTER 1: TOWARD CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY  
 
1.1. The general framework of Corporate Sustainability  
Until the first doubts about a more global responsibility have arisen, it was undisputed the doc-
trine for which “there is one and only one social responsibility of a business: to use it resources 
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits” (Friedman 1970, p. 6). Nevertheless, 
in the latest years such theory has been denied by several authors, favoring a broader responsi-
bility of firms, not anymore bounded to the ability of corporations to make profits, but enlarged 
toward the so-called Corporate Sustainability.  
The wide literature over Corporate Sustainability provides us several definitions of this concept, 
which can be described as a set of “company activities – voluntary by definition – demonstrat-
ing the inclusion of social and environmental concerns in business operations and in interactions 
with stakeholders” (Van Marrewijk & Werre 2003, p. 1). On the basis of such statement, it is 
clear that a corporation should be accountable to meet not only the obligations of its stockhold-
ers, but the ones of all the stakeholders which are interested in the firm’s business and which 
can affect its management: shareholders, employees, customers, community residents, pressure 
groups. Toward this goal, companies have to integrate economic, social and environmental di-
mensions for generating a positive collective consensus on the way in which they operate. 
Indeed, “a single-minded focus on economic sustainability can succeed in the short run; how-
ever, in the long run sustainability requires all three dimensions to be satisfied simultaneously” 
(Dyllick & Hockerts 2002, p. 132). This means that corporate performance should not be 
viewed only on the basis of economic and financial results, but the assessment should include 
non-financial indicators that focus on intangible assets and take into account relationships with 
employees, customers and other stakeholders (Dočekalová & Kocmanova 2016).  
The theory which encases the relevance of the integration among economic, environmental and 
social performance was described by John Elkington (1998), through the well-known Triple 
Bottom Line overture. Essentially, such approach advocates that the long-term success of a 
corporation requires emphasis on all the three dimensions of sustainability, that are interrelated 
and impact each other by varied and numerous means (Amini & Bienstock 2014). Conse-
quently, a corporation cannot completely separate its economic purpose from its social and 
environmental objectives, allowing sustainability to be a “2 + 2 = 5 game” (Elkington 1998, p. 
37).  
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The three different shades of sustainability just mentioned have different properties and require 
different approaches to be analyzed: 
• economic sustainability guarantees at any time cashflow sufficient to ensure liquidity while 
producing a persistent and above average return to shareholders; 
• environmental sustainability ensures that natural resources are kept within their regenera-
tion rates and that waste emissions do not exceed the capacity of the environment to 
assimilate them without impairment (Goodland 1995); 
• social sustainability implies increasing the human capital of individual partners and of 
communities, whether inside or outside corporate walls.  
The integration of such three dimensions is the milestone of Corporate Sustainability, integra-
tion that should be blended into companies’ everyday decisions and activities, enabling them to 
address the global responsibility toward internal and external stakeholders. Indeed, even if ini-
tially presented as a mere theoretical concept, Corporate Sustainability has gained more and 
more relevance in the latest years. It is not anymore seen as a simple marketing tactic to grab 
communities’ attention, but it is viewed as an important aspect of the corporate behavior which 
has to be included in the corporate strategy as well as in the corporate values.  
Nevertheless, the correct and complete implementation of Corporate Sustainability requires ef-
forts and resources that not all firms can afford, thus resulting in a variety of actions and policies 
that differ from one company to the other. Some firms simply behave ethically as a sign of 
“moral obligation” toward the society, thus carrying out the minimum level of investments for 
simply avoiding fines and legal costs due to the failure of law compliance. Such corporations 
are somehow stuck at the beginning of the social responsibility era, in which sustainability was 
seen as a set of actions and decisions implemented to bring long-run economic gains to compa-
nies, paying them back for their social or environmental involvement (Davis 1960). Quite the 
contrary, firms should move from such negative morality – which induces organizations to 
simply prevent actions that can harm others – to the incorporation of a positive morality, that 
leads companies to commit actively to help others to obtain their best (Maon, Lindgreen & 
Swaen 2010). Thus, Corporate Sustainability should penetrate within corporate values and cor-
porate culture, driving firms to favor other-regarding sentiments instead of their self-interests 
(Jones, Felps & Bigley 2007). This concept should not be viewed anymore as an obligation 
toward the society, but should be conceived as a doctrine which includes voluntariness, protec-
tion of the environment and transparency. It is no more bounded to stakeholders’ engagement, 
but it involves a variety actions to be undertaken both within and outside the corporate walls, 
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from the hiring of sustainability managers to the improved accountability of sustainability re-
porting (Rahman 2011). 
However, it is useless to assert aprioristically that ethical behaviors should be pursued by all 
firms in the competitive arena, and affirming that sustainability is always the right path to 
choose appears to be unwise and too general. Each company has to examine the specific context 
in which it operates and the particular situations which can be encountered. It should consider 
why it wants to behave ethically, the costs and benefits associated to such choice, and the pos-
sible short-term or long-term repercussions on its business. This is because even if the firm 
wants to behave responsibly, this does not implicitly mean that it has the resources to dedicate 
to such matter. Thus, it’s clear how each corporate reality presents different characteristics, 
motives, costs and advantages, making it necessary to understand the specific situation before 
making any general statement about the beneficial effects of Corporate Sustainability.  
 
1.2.  What drives firms to operate sustainably?  
After a brief theoretical excursus of the role played by economic, environmental and social 
goals, it’s relevant to understand the reasons why companies should follow the path of sustain-
ability. Indeed, sustainability is not only a matter of compliance with regulations and laws, but 
is about a complex context that firms have to deal with, which implies costs as well as savings. 
Nonetheless, it’s counterproductive to think about the drivers of sustainability only in terms of 
cost reductions or revenues enhancement: quite the contrary, many reasons – other than the 
economic ones – may lead firms to behave ethically. According to Bansal and Roth (2000), 
there are mainly three drivers of Corporate Sustainability: competitiveness, legitimation and 
ecological responsibility.  
Competitiveness, intended as the potential of sustainability to improve long-term profitability, 
guides ethical behaviors through costs reduction and revenues enhancement. While the intensi-
fication of production processes, the management of energy and wastes reduce environmental 
impacts as well as firms’ costs, green marketing and the development of eco-products lead to 
revenues boosting. This reasoning is consistent with the natural resource-based-view of Hart 
(1995), who asserted how environmentally sustainable activities are the root for allowing a firm 
to build its competitive advantage. Accordingly, firms that perceive environmental sustainabil-
ity as an opportunity rather than a threat, may be able to create new value propositions, thus 
attracting new customers (Gross & Ringbeck 2008). Nonetheless, despite sustainability has the 
potential to increase competitiveness and profitability, no unique relationship has been found 
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between the two phenomena, both from a theorical and from an empirical point of view. This 
is because several elements may play as facilitators or opposing forces to the beneficial impacts 
of sustainability over competitiveness, from the specific corporate strategy of a company to the 
overall industry or sector in which it operates. Indeed, although sustainability may lead a firm 
to develop more efficient processes, to grab new market opportunities and to improve produc-
tivity, if it operates in an industry with stringent environmental regulation, the higher 
environmental compliance costs will outweigh the benefits brought by acting responsibly 
(Wagner & Schaltegger 2003). This doubtful relation has led other authors to affirm that the 
enhancement of competitiveness or sustainability is primarily at the expense of the other, thus 
failing to corroborate the statements of either the advocates or the critics to the positive relation 
between the two phenomena (Aupperle, Carroll & Hatfield 1985). 
 “Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desira-
ble, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, 
and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 577). Legitimacy implies first of all the compliance with 
legislation: it is merely a passive behavior, pursued only because corporations want to avoid 
fines, penalties and legal costs connected to the failure of law observance. In other cases, it can 
be guided by governmental request for compliance: for example, the French government re-
quired all corporations listed on the French Stock Exchange to report on Corporate 
Sustainability issues (MacLeod & Lewis 2004). Furthermore, companies are interested in 
spreading trust both inside and outside the organization, for attracting, motivating and retaining 
employees on one side, and for improving corporate relations with partners, suppliers and cus-
tomers on the other (Lozano 2015). This is based on the belief that corporations have to gain 
their “license to operate”, a kind of approval provided by stakeholders, communities and the 
government about the activities performed by companies. Without this acceptance, firms might 
not be able to effectively carry on their activities and to successfully pursue their goals (Wilburn 
& Wilburn 2011). Legitimacy can thus be seen as the most important driver of Corporate Sus-
tainability, as “threats to a firm’s legitimacy were believed to undermine a firm’s license to 
operate and its long-term survival” (Bansal & Roth 2000, p. 727).  
Lastly, ecological responsibility is connected to the ethical motivations and concerns that may 
conduct firms to act responsibly, simply because it is the right thing to do. In this perspective, 
a fundamental key concept is the one of Corporate Philanthropy: the ethical behavior is not 
driven by any kind of obligation, but it is based upon the desire to do good. Ecological respon-
sibility is thus neither an obligation nor a reciprocal intention, it is simply a transfer of wealth 
from one party to another (Godfrey 2005). This means that firms have essentially altruistic 
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intentions, as they believe their ethical efforts are part and parcel of being a good global citizen 
(Sprinkle & Maines 2010). As a matter of fact, many companies are recently expanding their 
strategies to consider the effects that environmental preservation and sustainability have on 
their long-term performance, thus starting to integrate environmental and social concerns into 
their regular day-by-day activities (Koo, Chung & Ryoo 2014).  
Table 1 exhibits the three drivers of sustainability identified by Bansal and Roth (2000), sum-








Clearly, even if sustainability is a fundamental part of corporate values, and thus pursued be-
cause it is in the will of companies, firms will always seek for getting benefits from the 
implementation of sustainable behaviors. It should not be forgotten that, despite the economic 
purpose is not the only one to which a company should aspire, it is still meaningful: despite 
economic and social responsibility are integral parts of the global one, the latter has to be ac-
complished guaranteeing at the same time the company’s survival in the short and long term. 
The social costs must in any case be tolerable for the company, without jeopardizing its sol-
vency and financial liquidity (Sciarelli 2011).  
 
1.3. The costs and benefits for firms of acting sustainably  
Regardless of the reasons that may lead a company to behave ethically, Corporate Sustainability 
is not exempt from costs. The simple compliance with law as well as the implementation of 
complex sustainable practices imply expenses, which in some cases can undermine the eco-
nomic and financial equilibria of the company. This is the reason why usually before 
undertaking the path of sustainability companies perform a cost-benefit analysis, which “lies in 
the idea that things are worth doing if the benefits resulting from doing them outweigh their 
costs” (Sen 2000, p. 934).  
Driver Explanation
Competitiveness
Potential of sustainability to improve long-term 
profitability
Legitimation
Perception that the actions undertaken are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within the society
Ecological 
responsibility
Ethical behavior driven by altruistic intentions and by 
the deside to do good
Table 1: The drivers of sustainability. 
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Corporate Sustainability costs can range from the one-time charitable contributions to the costs 
for managers coordinating sustainable projects and producing promotion materials – like a 
cause-related marketing campaign. They include the additional risks a company has to bear 
(Weber 2008) and the opportunity costs estimated as the activities the company is unable to 
undertake due to its engagement in responsible policies (Sprinkle & Maines 2010). Moreover, 
an effective integration of sustainability into company’s strategy leads to intense changes in 
both organizational culture and corporate values, accompanied by an improvement of pro-
cesses, training, safety and quality, all elements that involve higher direct costs (Ameer & 
Othman 2012).  
Despite the costs connected to sustainability are the most significant barriers to the implemen-
tation of responsible policies, other obstacles may keep companies apart from such behaviors. 
Indeed, substantial time should be invested to design, develop and execute sustainable strate-
gies, time that would result as wasted if customers and stakeholders would not appreciate or not 
value more such kind of activities. Moreover, it is not a foregone conclusion that companies 
have in their workforce people who possess the knowledge and skills to cope with such kind of 
activities. If this is not the case, new costs for hiring knowledgeable employees need to be 
sustained, alongside the uncertainties connected to the integration of those new workers into 
the current workforce (Ervin et al 2013). 
However, if sustainability costs were not balanced by benefits, no firms would voluntarily un-
dertake ethical behaviors, as it may be not economically viable. Many of the benefits connected 
to Corporate Sustainability are the reasons why companies decide to engage in such practices. 
Indeed, such advantages do not only generate gains internal to firms – for example in terms of 
tax deduction for sustainability efforts – but also external ones, mainly linked to the spread of 
trust and reputation toward all the stakeholders.  
Being more specific, the first benefit a firm encounter when acting responsibly is the enhance-
ment of corporate image and reputation: “companies are increasingly often asked to 
demonstrate that their actions and policies meet various predetermined social and ethical crite-
ria. Doing so can help build reputation; failing to do so can be a source of reputational risk” 
(Fombrun 2005, p. 7). In turn, a good reputation generates competitive advantage, allowing the 
firm to achieve its objectives easily, given the positive image that is divulged toward both in-
ternal and external stakeholders (Iwu-Egwuonwu 2011).  
Secondly, responsible behaviors have positive impacts over employees’ engagement, motiva-
tion and retention. There is considerable empirical support for such argument: most of all, 
sustainability develops an employee’s achievement needs and hence motivates the employee to 
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work (Kim & Scullion 2013). Furthermore, for supporting Corporate Sustainability, companies 
usually introduce measures which directly benefit workers, such as education and training ac-
tivities, a suitable work-life balance and equal pay, which empower both intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations. A sustainable firm may also attract those workers which really care about working 
in an eco-friendly environment, attraction which is boosted also by the positive effects of all 
the practices implemented for behaving ethically. Indeed, firms get advantages also by match-
ing workers with corporate volunteerism, which allow employees to develop their talent, their 
leadership skills and to create a better strategic sense about how to deal with different environ-
ments (Needleman 2008). 
Third, responsible companies may either capture price premiums over their products or gain an 
increase in market share given the superior “social quality” of its offerings. This can be reached 
indirectly through the enhancement of brand image and reputation, or directly with product and 
process development. Actually, “ethical associations do not only affect product evaluation, but 
also customers identification with the company, customers satisfaction and trust. Moreover, 
customers are more willing to relate with companies carrying out socially responsible initia-
tives, as part of self-enhancement and self-esteem” (Martínez & Del Bosque 2013, p. 97). 
Fourthly, sustainable practices also create internal benefits for the organization in terms of costs 
reduction, mainly due to energy conservation, reduced material storage, abated handling costs 
and waste disposal. Such actions generate a positive reaction from stakeholders, such as cus-
tomers who may benefit from these savings – in terms of price reductions or product 
improvements – or investors, whose increased sensitivity toward sustainability issues lead to 
an amelioration of the access to capital (Epstein & Roy 2001). 
Lastly, ethical behaviors can be seen as part and parcel of a company’s risk management efforts. 
Such practices may help companies to deal with legal and regulatory constraints, thus avoiding 
negative press or customers and NGO boycotts. To this end, many multinational companies are 
planning to continually reduce emissions, mainly because of the pressures they receive from 
the context in which they operate, but also as they want to enhance their positioning in the 
market by promoting their products as eco-friendly (Bradsher & Revkin 2001). Furthermore, 
all these introductions might lower the risk of accidents to occur, accidents which may lead to 
lawsuits or which may harm the firm’s reputation and image.   
The benefits just described are only a part of the positive effects of behaving ethically: there 
are likely other advantages about undertaking the path of sustainability, like spillover effects or 
better relations with partners along the whole value chain. Thus, given that being responsible 
positively influence companies, is it possible to say that pursuing such trajectory is simply a 
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smarter and more convenient way of making profits? Even if it is clear how sustainability ben-
efits firms in different ways, it is not useful to say a priori that ethicality always improve the 
status of companies, especially when some prerequisites need to be fulfilled.  
 
1.4. Firm’s specific enabling factors of sustainable behaviors 
The balance between the costs and benefits of behaving ethically depends on the specific con-
text in which a company operates, and the practicability of sustainability is contingent to some 
preconditions intrinsic to the firm’s operations. It is possible to call them the enabling factors 
of sustainable behaviors, ergo those elements that favor the spread of sustainability within busi-
nesses. However, firm’s behaviors are not influenced only by company’s characteristics, but 
also by the traits and values of those managers who are in the best position to shape such kind 
of practices, the top management.  
 
1.4.1. Organizational level factors  
The literature starts to debate the influence of a company’s characteristics over sustainability 
issues from its size, pointing out that larger organizations are more likely to address ethical 
responsibilities. Indeed, large organizations tend to be involved more in sustainability because 
of their greater exposure and external pressure: large firms are more politically visible, and so 
they capture more attention from the public, the government and other stakeholders. They are 
also more likely to generate larger social problems because of the large scale and scope of their 
activities (Artiach et al. 2010). Therefore, the fear of bad image and reputation encourage large 
organization to make more efforts for avoiding environmental scandals or lawsuits for the fail-
ure of laws’ compliance.   
Moreover, large companies have access to a broader range of resources compared to small and 
medium enterprises, resources crucial to fund the investments needed to commit in ethical be-
haviors. Indeed, “such initiatives are designed primarily for large firms that have the human 
and financial resources to implement the required procedures into their business operations” 
(Baumann-Pauly et al. 2013, p. 3). Moreover, sustainability policies take time and abilities to 
be developed: managers must be trained, alternatives must be evaluated, and the results of the 
practices implemented must be assessed – all activities that clearly require assets and capital to 
be executed. At the same time, large corporations are associated with greater resource-slack, 
which affects positively their commitment to sustainability (Johnson & Greening 1999).  
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Nevertheless, organizational slack coming from better economic and financial performance is 
not an exclusive peculiarity of large firms. This implies that large companies, as well as small 
and medium enterprises with greater profitability, have more resources to employ for responsi-
ble policies. Therefore, when profitability is high, companies are facing less pressure from both 
internal and external stakeholders, having at the same time the resources available to invest in 
sustainable activities. By contrast, firms with weak performance are less induced to meet even 
the minimum threshold of sustainability, as such additional investments may jeopardize share-
holders value (Campbell 2007). Such firms are more likely to give priority to the economic and 
financial survival, neglecting social and environmental claims that may derive from internal or 
external stakeholders (Kent & Monem 2008).  
 
1.4.2. Individual level factors 
When assessing the drivers of sustainability, it is not neglectable the impact of managers’ needs 
and values over the implementation of ethical policies, given that “top managers are obviously 
in the best position to influence these types of strategies and projects” (Metcalf & Benn 2013, 
p. 373). For this purpose, it is possible to avail of the study of Burns (1978), who identified two 
different kinds of leadership styles which can be exhibited from managers: transactional and 
transformational leadership. While the first study of Burns identified the two styles as alterna-
tive, subsequent researches conceptualize that mangers can manifest both.  
Bass (1990) illustrated a transactional leader as a manager who motivates employees through a 
contingent-reward system, thus offering rewards to workers on the basis of their efforts, per-
formance and accomplishments. The leader intervenes only if standards are not met and he or 
she abdicates responsibilities, thus avoiding making decisions. On the contrary, a transforma-
tional leader seeks to motivate followers to accept new goals and new ways of doing things. He 
or she has the aspiration of empowering and elevating followers, leading to an increase in sub-
ordinates’ awareness of the importance of their tasks: this permits to motivate subordinates to 
work for the good of the organization rather than exclusively for their own personal gain or 
benefit. 
It is clearly expected that transformational leadership – and not transactional – inspires more 
sustainable policies, for several reasons. Firstly, transformational leaders are more inclined to-
ward altruistic behaviors, given that they are highly ethical and focused on values, while 
transactional leaders are more focused on the use of power, sanctions and rewards (Du et al. 
2013). Secondly, transformational leaders stimulate and encourage followers to innovate when 
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solving problems, thus guiding subordinates to think widely about how to serve all the organi-
zational stakeholders. This concept, called intellectual stimulation, is positively associated to 
sustainable policies (Waldman, Siegel & Javidan 2006). Indeed, transformational leaders are 
more likely to understand the intricate interconnections between a firm and its several stake-
holders, looking at the company more as an interdependent entity rather than an isolated object. 
Contrariwise, transactional leaders have a predominant stockholder view, considering ethical 
behaviors only a distraction from the firm’s core responsibility: to use its resources to increase 
profits (Friedman 1970).  
The dichotomy between transactional and transformational styles simply represents the starting 
point for understanding how leaders can influence Corporate Sustainability. Indeed, even if 
transformational leaders are more inclined toward sustainability, their characteristics are not 
sufficient to describe the traits that a sustainable leader should present. This is one of the reasons 
why further studies about the impacts of the individual leader over sustainable behaviors and 
about the role of the Board of Directors as a whole in such practices have been performed, 
mainly for providing broader evidence about the key role of top-level managers in shaping 
environmental strategies. Additionally, also the wide and vast literature over organization’s 
size, company’s resources and firm’s performance connected to sustainability have led scholars 
to focus more on its leadership part. The attention has been turned from organizational factors 
to individual ones, trying to understand the demographic characteristics of corporate leaders 
that are associated to greater social and environmental responsibility (Glass, Cook & Ingersoll 
2016).  
Race, age, education and gender are only some of the facilitators that Corporate Sustainability 
may encounter in its implementation. The visible features of leaders are not the only character-
istics that can influence their ethical behaviors, but they are accompanied by leaders’ values 
and skills, as well as their knowledge and styles. Nevertheless, the two sides are not independent 
one to the other: age, gender, or race are the first influencers of a person’s values and styles.  
An accurate analysis of such facilitators will be performed in the following Chapter which, 
rather than focusing on the wider literature over organizational level factors, will give priority 
to leaders’ role over sustainability. A profound assessment will be performed over gender di-
versity – as it is the most widely debated characteristic in literature – with its positive 
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CHAPTER 2: WOMEN REPRESENTATION AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 
 
2.1. Leaders’ influence over Corporate Sustainability 
The contextual changes brought by the increasing relevance of Corporate Sustainability are 
altering not only the way in which companies have to deal with the external environment, but 
also the internal equilibria of firms. In particular, new leaders’ attributes are required to match 
the shifting conditions of the competitive environment, starting from an evolved consciousness 
of the repercussion of firms’ businesses in the setting in which they operate, and going toward 
a clear understanding about how to consider social and environmental trends into the strategic 
decision-making process (Tideman, Arts & Zandee 2013).  
It has been already anticipated how transformational leaders are more expected to inspire sus-
tainable policies than transactional leaders, given that they guide followers and they promote a 
common vision of value creation (Veríssimo & Lacerda 2015). But is it sufficient a deep un-
derstanding of transformational leadership to identify the traits a sustainable leader needs to 
have? Unfortunately, it is far from real to equal transformational leaders with the wider defini-
tion of leadership for sustainability, a concept even more complex and articulated than the one 
described by Bass (1990). Indeed, further studies identified how transformational leaders 
should be accompanied by transactional elements, namely the contingent reward, which allows 
to link employees’ and managers’ reward to the accomplishment of sustainable goals, ensuring 
the compliance with the company’s environmental strategy. As a matter of facts, sustainable 
leadership grounds on the features of both transformational and transactional leadership, which 
are mutually required for fulfilling the ramification of corporate relations toward internal and 
external stakeholders (Egri & Herman 2000).  
Nevertheless, the wide literature over transactional and transformational leadership is only the 
starting point for a deeper analysis over the features that may affect the behaviors of sustainable 
leaders. Indeed, the factors influencing the propensity toward sustainability are not bounded to 
leadership styles, but they include also the skills, capabilities and demographic characteristics 
of leaders, which may enhance or limit the orientation toward responsible behaviors. Moreover, 
it is not only a matter of individual values and traits, but leadership for sustainability includes 
also a wider prospect about the way in which such individual features interact with the individ-
ual characteristics of other members of the Board of Directors. Indeed, differences in age, 
gender and values may benefit the Board’s decision-making process through greater creativity, 
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ideas and innovation brought by the acquisition of new critical resources (Goodstein, Gautam 
& Boeker 1994). 
In the following paragraphs are depicted the factors influencing sustainable behaviors at an 
individual and group level, starting from the personal features of leaders, and then explaining 
how such characteristics interact in the broader context of the Board of Directors. Focusing on 
such committee, it will be explained how its composition affects the way in which it operates, 
emphasizing one of the demographic characteristics most discussed in literature: gender.  
 
2.2.  The leadership for sustainability  
The dynamic nature of Corporate Sustainability implies leaders of extraordinary abilities: they 
are supposed to be leaders who can juggle with composite problems, who have emotional in-
telligence to deal with personal emotions and who act as mediators for successful 
implementation of responsible policies (Metcalf & Benn 2013). Following the suggestions by 
Boiral, Cayer and Baron (2009), sustainable leaders must be able to deal and understand the 
complexity of environmental issues, addressing the expectations of a wide range of stakehold-
ers while changing organizational practices to this end. Therefore, sustainable leaders must be 
the drivers of ethical behaviors, so “individuals who are compelled to make a difference by 
deepening their awareness of themselves in relation to the world around them. In doing so, they 
adopt new ways of seeing, thinking and interacting that result in innovative, sustainable solu-
tions” (Sustainability Leadership Institute 2011).  
Visser and Courtice (2011) designed and tested the Sustainability Leadership Model, a pattern 
which helps to understand and identify the elements that may influence positively or negatively 
the sustainable behaviors of leaders. The model they propose has three components:  
1. the external and internal context for leadership;  
2. the traits, styles, skills and knowledge of the individual leader;  
3. the leadership actions.  
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Figure 1: Cambridge Sustainability Leadership Model (Visser & Courtice 2011). 
 
 
The first element which affects the extent of sustainable policies is the context, which refers to 
the environment where leaders operate, which may have a direct or indirect impact on their 
decision-making process and on their behaviors. The context can be external and internal. Over 
external context, leaders have a limited level of influence and control, because it is outside the 
boundaries of their institutions, like economic, political, cultural and ecological contexts. On 
the other side, context internal to institutions allows to be better handled and affected by leaders, 
as organizational culture and governance structure.  
Secondly, also personal and individual characteristics of individual leaders are described by the 
model as facilitators or opposing forces to sustainability. They are divided into: 
• traits, which describe the tendencies of a person to feel, think, act and behave in certain 
ways (George, Jones, & Sharbrough 2005); 
• styles, which specifies the manners and ways in which leaders provide direction, imple-
ment plans and motivate people (Newstrom & Davis 1993); 
• skills, intended as the ability to do an activity or job well; 
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• knowledge, either in terms of consciousness about global challenges or in terms of its 
management within the organization for allowing the planning, development and im-
provement of actions for handling different stakeholders’ views (Baumgartner & Ebner 
2010). 
The authors believed that sustainable leaders should embody traits, styles, skills and knowledge 
which facilitate the implementation and pursuing of sustainable policies, which are summarized 
and explained in Table 2.  
 
 
Lastly, for being socially and environmentally responsible, sustainable policies should not only 
be crafted in a proper manner, but should be also accurately executed by leaders. In fact, exe-
cuting the strategy generates new information from the competitive environment, including the 
responses of competitors, regulators and customers (Sull 2007). Corporate Sustainability must 
not be a narrow statement which sets social and environmental objectives or a simple code of 
conduct, but it should involve the implementation of concrete leadership actions embedded in 
Traits Styles Skills Knowledge
Morally-driven Inclusive Manage complexity Global challenges
Care of the well-being of 
humanity
Being collaborative and 
participative
Understanding of complex 
issues 
Deal with social and 
ecological pressures
Holistic thinker Visionary Communicate vision Interconnectedness
Understanding of how the 
different parts of the 
system affect the whole
Being charismatic, 
challenging and motivate 
people
Share the vision, the 
mission and the objectives 
of the firm
Understand the relation 
among physical, social 
science and technology
Open-minded Creative Exercise judgment Change dynamics
Willingness to consider 
new or different ideas and 
opinions
Being innovator and 
transformer of the system
Making good decisions in 
a timely fashion
Understanding the wide 
range of options from 
which to tap into
Empathetic Altruistic Innovate Organizational impacts
Ability to understand and 
share the emotions of 
others
Focusing on the good of 
the whole rather than on 
the personal interests
Imagine new possible 
solutions and think 
outside the box
Identify the effects of 
decisions over value 
creation 
Courageous Radical Think long term Stakeholder view
Being inspirational, 
creative and optimistic 
Acting as a challenger of 
the status quo
Using long term thinking 
and planning
Understanding of their 
different viewpoints 
Table 2: Traits, styles, skills and knowledge of sustainable leaders.  
Source: Personal elaboration based on Cambridge Sustainability Leadership Model (Visser & Courtice 2011). 
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the day-by-day decisions of corporations. This is because “although an increasing number of 
corporations publish environmental, health and safety reports, many are simply token efforts, 
and few addresses the full range of social issues necessary to assess adequately a corporation’s 
behavior” (Lydenberg 2002, p. 61). 
Therefore, if companies decide to engage in the direction of sustainability, leadership should 
be the primary engine at all levels. The tasks of sustainable leaders must include the implemen-
tation of all the policies and practices for satisfying social and environmental goals, which is 
ensured by their trained ability to think in aggregate terms and to behave for affecting the en-
vironment in which they operate as a whole (Fullan 2005).  
Nevertheless, the individual traits of leaders have to interact in the broader context of the Board 
of Directors: the design, implementation and assessment of the impact of ethical policies cannot 
be realized without the robust engagement of such committee. It is especially the Board in-
volvement and diversity which strengthen its propensity toward sustainability, even if there are 
also other principles that may influence its behavior (Epstein 2018). An even stronger pressure 
is imposed by the CEO, who imprints firms with his or her own values, influencing and affect-
ing also the way in which managers prioritize the different stakeholder claims, thus impacting 
the whole social performance of firms (Christensen, Mackey & Whetten 2014). 
 
2.2.1. The role of the Board of Directors 
Boards of Directors shape the strategic directions of their organizations: they have control over 
the strategy of firms, and they have access to resources which include legitimacy and links to 
other companies (Hendry & Kiel 2004). As such, they have the duty and responsibility to mon-
itor the actions and the performance of firms, playing a key role in supervising managers’ 
behavior and in crafting and executing strategies (De Andres & Vallelado 2008). 
Given the critical role of the Board in the success of a company’s strategy, its involvement is 
needed also for the efficient achievement of Corporate Sustainability. This happens because the 
BoD’s personal commitment will ensure social and environmental goals to be included in the 
mission and vision statements, while supporting the spread of the culture of sustainability any-
where within the company. Indeed, the personal engagement of Directors will encourage 
employees to comply with company’s strategy and to behave ethically in turn, which is funda-
mental given that workers are at the forefront in the production process and with customers.  
Epstein (2018) identified six core principles which can help Boards in formulating the strategy 
of companies and in improving their sustainable behaviors: 
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• leadership, which is an emergent quality that helps organizations to identify and achieve 
material goals – such as sustainability – that may otherwise remain unrealized (Redekop 
2010); 
• engagement, not only of directors and employees, but widely of all the parties interested in 
the firm’s operations, as “the more an organization engages with its stakeholders, the more 
accountable and responsible that organization is towards these stakeholders” (Greenwood 
2007, p. 316); 
• alignment between corporate strategy in its generalities and sustainable policies, which 
implies the inclusion of environmental and social aspects into the strategic management 
system of a firm (Figge et al. 2002); 
• diversity, which leads to the generation of heterogeneous Boards in terms of different back-
grounds, personalities, races, genders and abilities; 
• evaluation of Boards’ performance – regarding both the Board as a whole and the individ-
ual director – which provides a process for highlighting potential issues and promoting 
discussions before the achievement of the crisis point (Kiel & Nicholson 2005); 
• responsibility in its broader sense, considering that nowadays Boards no longer believe that 
stockholders are the only constituencies they are accountable to, but they comprehend that 
their responsibilities embrace all stakeholders (Wang & Dewhirst 1992). 
These six principles help to remark how the Board of Directors plays a fundamental role in 
defining the sustainable orientation of firms, not only because it is appointed for crafting the 
overall corporate strategy, but also because its own performance affect the level of transparency 
and sustainability of the company for which it operates.  
 
2.2.2. The role of the Chief Executive Officer  
The increasing uncertainty of the environment in which firms operate is enhancing the role of 
the Chief Executive Officer, which does not simply conform the organization to its external 
environment, but also manage the internal operations by providing strategic vision and direction 
to the enterprise (Zuckerman 1989).  
Therefore, the CEO is responsible for ensuring the alignment between social, environmental 
and economic goals, given that its position is key to convince all company’s stakeholders that 
sustainability has to be set as a corporate goal. Indeed, the CEO has to communicate to employ-
ees, suppliers, communities and other stakeholders the firm’s position over social and 
environmental issues. To this end, the letter from the CEO to shareholders in corporate annual 
 - 21 - 
reports should convey about the future of the firm, as well as about the firm’s commitment to 
sustainability by stating its goals, mission and vision (Epstein 2018).  
CEO values, as well as its demographic characteristics, are associated with sustainable activities 
within the firm. His or her values will define the way in which sustainability is included in the 
day-by-day operations as well as in the mission and vision statement (Christensen, Mackey & 
Whetten 2014); while its gender, age and education are seen as strong predictors of Corporate 
Sustainability Performance (Manner 2010). 
It is clear how is in the responsibility of the CEO and of the Board of Directors to introduce, 
convey and execute social and environmental goals. They have to incorporate sustainability 
values at all the strategy’s levels, by developing methods for identifying and measuring corpo-
rate impacts on society and by creating incentive systems for promoting the pursuing of ethical 
behaviors within firms.  
Given the central role played by both the CEO and the Board of Directors in defining sustain-
able strategies, scholars started to focus on their demographic characteristics for identifying the 
factors that facilitate social and environmental behaviors (Glass, Cook & Ingersoll 2016). The 
main body of attention is about gender parity, the most important and relevant social matter 
which is representing a current challenge for winning companies.    
 
2.3.  Board diversity, women representation and sustainability 
Social and environmental issues, such as the growing income inequality, the unsustainable use 
of our planet’s natural resources, the climate crisis and gender parity are becoming the biggest 
impact factors on the world (World Economic Forum 2015). The interconnections among these 
aspects are increasingly making harder the resolution of such problems: the settlement of one 
phenomenon may have negative effects over other social and environmental matters, maybe 
worsening the whole scenario.  
From a company point of view, it is known how corporate governance considerably affect 
firm’s influence over social and environmental issues and, combining this aspect with the 
proven relevance of Corporate Sustainability, it becomes worthy to analyze the relation between 
the two phenomena. Indeed, given the growing evidence of the connection between business 
management and ethical behaviors, “scholars have begun to examine the ways in which corpo-
rate leadership composition affects corporate strategies with regard to socially responsible 
practices” (Glass, Cook & Ingersoll 2016, p. 496). Furthermore, a considerable and expanding 
literature links governance composition not only to sustainable behaviors, but to a broader set 
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of organizational outcomes which moves from firms’ performance to stakeholders’ responses. 
Consequently, defining the right composition of Boards is critical: it implies the identification 
of the best blend in terms of backgrounds, skills, nationalities, ages and genders, thus allowing 
the generation of wider varieties of ideas and perspectives (Galbreath 2011). This happens be-
cause cognitive functioning and beliefs tend to differ with demographic variables such as race 
and gender, leading to the generation of various viewpoint which increase creativity and inno-
vation. Heterogeneity implies not only more solutions, but also better solutions, either because 
the group has a variety of resources at its disposal or because, given their differences, group 
members are more likely to challenge each other for finding superior ways of doing things 
(Robinson & Dechant 1997).  
Board diversity is thus needed by firms to succeed, given the multiculturalism and gender sen-
sitivity which nowadays characterize the modern society. Indeed, among the various Board 
diversity characteristics, gender is the most widely debated feature in literature, as it represents 
the greatest issue faced by modern corporations (Rao & Tilt 2016). It has been recently per-
ceived as a relevant matter also in other societal situations and especially in politics, in which, 
over the last thirty years, wider mechanisms not only bounded to quotas have been introduced 
to increase women representation (Childs & Dahlerup 2018).  
Gender diversity and the related female representation on Boards is thus embodying a current 
social matter, and the pressure to increase the presence of women directors is particularly acute 
at a global level. From an European point of view, more than a decade ago Norway was the 
first country to introduce a 40% quota for women representation on Boards in 2004. It was then 
followed by other nations either with the adoption of mandatory quotas, as Germany, France 
and Italy, or voluntary goals as Sweden, Netherland and Austria (Wiersema & Mors 2016). On 
a worldwide basis, developing countries as well as developed ones are recognizing the facets 
of the women representation, highlighting the paramount relevance of gender diversity what-
ever is the firm’s home country, the firm’s size or the firm’s turnover.  
The presence of women on Boards has been linked to several and disparate outcomes in the 
latest years, starting from the relation between female directors and financial performance, 
moving toward the positive effect over firm’s value or over firm’s social and environmental 
policies. The literature about these connections resulted in a mix evidence, although it is widely 
recognized that gender diversity can be reached without destroying shareholders value, thus 
allowing for overall company’s improvements (Campbell & Vera 2010).  
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2.3.1. Women in the BoDs and firms’ value and performance 
As stated by Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader (2003, p. 104) “given the current literature suggesting 
that diversity tends to generate higher creativity, innovation and quality decision-making at 
individual and group level, it is worthwhile to identify whether similar findings can be found at 
the executive Board of Directors level, where these characteristics are most critical”.  
Board functioning is crucial not only for the definition of firms’ strategy, but also to address 
and influence companies’ performance, especially when the Board strategic power is coupled 
with a similar power position of the CEO (Zahra & Pearce 1989). It is clear how in first instance 
it is the Board itself – regardless of its composition – which affects corporate success. But 
digging deeper, Board diversity and more precisely female representation are even stronger 
influencers of economic-financial performance and firms’ value.  
Despite there is a wide body of literature examining the relationship between women represen-
tation on Boards and firm performance, the empirical evidence is mixed. Some studies 
suggested how female directors negatively relate to firm’s performance and accounting returns 
(Shrader, Blackburn & Iles 1997), while others do not find significative relation between the 
gender diversity of the Board and the financial performance of corporations (Carter et al. 2010). 
Nevertheless, the greatest part of the paperwork highlights how female representation leads to 
positive outcomes at the firm’s level, both in terms of economic-financial performance and of 
positive stock market reaction. The effect is even amplified for greater female representation: 
the higher the proportion of women directors, the higher the firm’s value (Nguyen & Faff 2007). 
These broader findings have induced scholars to considered gender discrimination as econom-
ically suboptimal rather than – or additional than – immoral (Isidro & Sobral 2015). Indeed, if 
firms are not able to accurately recruit valuable individuals – especially if women – they will 
fail to get access to precious resources and skills needed to thrive. Thus, bad recruiting with 
annexed gender disparity are not in the best interest of firms, quite the contrary, they represent 
a limit to its functioning: not only because valuable competencies are lost, but also because 
several theories sustained how female Directors positively impacts firms’ value.  
First of all, women representation on Boards allows to reduce the misalignment between share-
holders and managers goals and interests, which is one of the main problems of the agency 
theory. Applying that theory within organizations, shareholders – the principals – delegate work 
to managers – the agents – who perform that work on their behalf. For shareholders it is very 
complex to verify whether managers are behaving appropriately or not, and this aspect is even 
more emphasized when the principal and the agent have different risk profiles (Eisenhardt 
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1989). To limit the repercussions of the agency problems, the Board of Directors plays a fun-
damental role, thanks to its monitoring function towards the behaviors of top-level managers 
(Fama & Jensen 1983). Given that monitoring by the entire Board is associated with increases 
in firm’s value (Brick & Chidambaran 2010), the triangle becomes clear: if women representa-
tion improves Board monitoring, the greater supervision over managers’ behaviors will allow 
greater shareholders’ value. In support to this claim, gender parity positively relates to Board 
effectiveness as well as to Board monitoring: female directors tend to have impacts comparable 
to independent directors, as they are more likely to be assigned to monitor-related tasks (Adams 
& Ferreira 2009). Female directors are thus associated to stronger monitoring activities and 
independence of the Board, therefore allowing for an increase in firm’s value.  
Secondly, the internal advantages of Board diversity are even more pronounced when diversity 
comes from women: female directors do not only provide different types of knowledge and 
capabilities, but also particular sets of expertise which are usually missing in the current Boards. 
Thus, the unique skills contribution of women would enhance the heterogeneity of Boards 
which – in turn – would increase the advisory effectiveness of the Board and improve firm’s 
value (Kim & Starks 2016). Moreover, companies believing in women representation are more 
likely to have female employees highly motivated to excel, because they perceive that if they 
want, they can reach the top. In such realities, people are promoted and hired on the basis of 
their knowledge and skills – regardless of other demographic characteristics – allowing com-
panies to successfully motivate employees making them feel as a part of an equal working 
environment (Lückerath-Rovers 2013). 
Lastly, from an external point of view, the presence of women on Boards has positive effects 
on corporate reputation, especially in industries that work close to the final customer: female 
directors are viewed to contribute important skills, allowing Boards to operate more effectively 
when the proximity with customers is high (Brammer, Millington & Pavelin 2009). Indeed, a 
more gender diverse Board enhances the reputation as well as the image of the firm – boosting 
its performance and increasing shareholders’ value – especially when corporate conducts have 
positive effects on customers’ behavior (Smith, Smith & Verner 2006). Moreover, female di-
rectors are generally more stakeholder oriented than male directors, thus allowing for better 
connections and interactions with all the relevant interested parties, ensuring the protection and 
respect of their interests (Adams & Funk 2012). Stakeholder orientation is fundamental in a 
framework where external factors are playing an even more relevant role in influencing com-
panies’ behaviors. In such a setting, Boards – serving as a linkage between the internal context 
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of a firm and its external environment – can act to reduce environmental uncertainty and de-
pendence, thus guaranteeing a lasting degree of stability to the overall business (Hillman, 
Withers & Collins 2009). 
It is therefore clear that women representation on Boards “positively contribute to Board deci-
sion making, because female directors bring experiences, knowledge, and values that increase 
the pool of information considered in decision making. Moreover, female board representation 
improves firms’ ability to generate profits from their assets and investments” (Post & Byron 
2015, p. 1560). Adding to these favorable effects the reputational factor, gender parity on top-
level positions is no more a moral duty over the society or an obligation to comply with law, 
but it is a viable solution for firms to be competitive in the market while enhancing their per-
formance and value.    
 
2.3.2. Women in the BoDs and firms’ sustainable behaviors  
Corporate Sustainability is increasingly perceived as a source of competitive advantage (Iwu-
Egwuonwu 2011), which positively relates to employees’ engagement, customers’ satisfaction, 
stakeholders’ legitimation as well as to costs and risks reduction. These benefits explain why 
sustainability has gained such prominence in the latest years, becoming a critical issue to be 
discussed by the top management and a key goal to be included in the company’s strategy. Not 
surprisingly, Board of Directors and CEOs are increasingly addressing their attention to find 
new ways of enhancing social and environmental performance, allowing for a better and effi-
cient satisfaction of the claims of all stakeholders.  
To this end, companies have first of all to understand what being ecologically responsible im-
plies, while identifying how to integrate sustainability within their existing resources, needs and 
challenges. Indeed, some firms may have claims from stakeholders requiring social welfare, 
others for environmental protection, and others for safety and health (Kakabadse 2007). Subse-
quently, companies have to embody such purposes within their corporate strategy, intention 
which is guaranteed by the personal commitment of the Board of Directors. Board engagement 
toward sustainability secures the introduction of social and environmental objectives within 
company’s mission and vision, as well as the compliance of the defined responsible goals by 
employees.  
Board involvement can be enhanced through the recruitment of sustainable-oriented and inde-
pendent directors, who act as a balancing mechanism ensuring that companies behave in the 
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best interest of owners as well as of all the other stakeholders. Furthermore, independent direc-
tors put pressure on firms to engage in Corporate Sustainability, securing consistency between 
organizational actions and social or environmental values, due to their greater interest in satis-
fying the social responsibilities of firms (Haniffa & Cooke 2005).  
One often recommended solution is to increase the number of women on Boards, as female 
directors tend to have impacts comparable to independent directors (Adams & Ferreira 2009). 
Indeed, women may ask question that would not come from directors with more traditional 
backgrounds (Carter, Simkins & Simpson 2003), and their non-conventional characteristics al-
low them to be more independent (Kang, Cheng & Gray 2007).  
The superior independence of women is not the only reason which promotes their greater at-
tention toward Corporate Sustainability. Several studies have identified how women’s values, 
experiences, skills and backgrounds positively influence such matter, leading firms to provide 
additional relevance to stakeholders’ needs and claims (Glass, Cook & Ingersoll 2016; Fernan-
dez‐Feijoo, Romero & Ruiz‐Blanco 2014). Indeed, given that men and women have different 
viewpoints and aptitudes, “these differences help to ensure a balanced approach in response to 
economic, environmental and social matters” (Galbreath 2011, p. 31). 
Even if the majority of empirical studies exhibited a positive relation between women repre-
sentation and sustainability, others resulted in a mix evidence: indeed, are not absent the 
researches showing a null connection, especially with reference to environmental sustainability 
(Hussain, Rigoni & Orij 2018). This happens because men directors are expected to have career 
experience in traditional masculine sectors, like engineering and science (Singh, Terjesen & 
Vinnicombe 2008), resulting in sex-biases and stereotyping more in environmental matters than 
in social ones. Moreover, another reason for explaining the divergence among the different 
researches is that studies tend to focus on firms from a single country, consequently, country-
level factors and authorities influence the extent to which female directors can affect and impact 
the strategy of firms (Byron & Post 2016). Specifically, in some countries, women directors 
may encounter discriminations and stereotyping which limit their potentiality to influence cor-
porate strategy, thus directing researches toward misleading results (Rao & Tilt 2016).  
Authors tend therefore to attribute the mix evidence of researches to their limits, and this argu-
ment is even sustained by the theoretical implications of women representation on Boards, as 
their greatest part are in favor of a positive relation between female directors and social and 
environmental performance.  
The stakeholder theory of Evan and Freeman (1988) postulates how the top management of a 
corporation has the duty of preserving the wealth of the business by balancing the different 
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claims of the multiple interested parties: this means that the management should not provide 
priority to one stakeholder group over another, quite the contrary, it should maintain the rela-
tionship with stakeholders in balance. Precisely, dealing with different interested parties 
requires the ability to maintain positive relations with all stakeholders as well as a relational-
oriented perspective, a feature intrinsic of women leaders. Female directors are less shareholder 
oriented than male directors (Adams & Funk 2012), thus allowing corporations to keep the 
equilibrium among the different stakeholders’ claims, without giving primacy to investors over 
the other interested parties. Moreover, women on Boards are expected to be more cooperative, 
collaborative, and more focused on enhancing the needs of others than their own needs (Eagly 
& Johannesen‐Schmidt 2001). Indeed women – compared to men – are more likely to show 
interpersonal-oriented, democratic and participative leadership styles, being thus more directed 
toward the welfare of others, more friendly and ready to provide help to customers or to explain 
procedures to subordinates (Van Engen & Willemsen 2004). Such relational abilities are essen-
tial for ensuring a worth and robust stakeholder management, allowing for the preservation and 
understanding of their economic, social and environmental claims. Indeed, stakeholder man-
agement is one way for the accomplishment of Corporate Sustainability, being “a rare 
management practice aiming to integrate economic, social, and environmental issues” into cor-
porate goals (Konrad et al. 2006, p. 102).  
Historically women faced greater barriers to entry and career growth in corporations. This is 
one of the reasons why they are more sensitive toward social problems and issues, showing 
greater concern for Corporate Social Performance compared to men (Backhaus, Stone & Heiner 
2002). Also female directors’ values tend to be aligned with social aims, as they are more in-
clined than men to enter into relationships, to address the needs of others and to feel responsible 
for not causing harm (Setó‐Pamies 2015). Indeed, while men are more economically oriented, 
women are more philanthropic driven, and they tend to provide more relevance to charitable 
events, community services and cultural activities (Ibrahim & Angelidis 1994).  
In support of this, the research of Hillman, Cannella and Harris (2002) showed how women 
directors are less likely to have business backgrounds compared to men but, nevertheless, they 
are more likely to hold advanced degrees. Thus, even if they do not bring business resources to 
corporation, female directors serve the Board with their skills and abilities in marketing and 
public relations, by being civic, community and government-oriented leaders. Indeed, rather 
than being business experts, women tend to be community influencers, providing non-business 
perspectives to corporations and expertise about how to influence and satisfy powerful groups 
in the community.  
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Additionally, directors with advanced degrees – a characteristic typical of women – tend to be 
more sensitive toward variables such as the status of the environment and the commitment to 
the society. This is because a higher level of education provides a greater awareness toward 
Corporate Sustainability and, accordingly, companies with highly educated executives are more 
likely to pursue responsible policies (Del Mar Alonso-Almeida, Perramon & Bagur 2015). 
The concern of organizations about sustainable practices positively impacts also product posi-
tioning as well as purchase intentions of customers, as they perceive such firms to be involved 
toward customers’ wellbeing, employees’ gratification and stakeholders’ satisfaction 
(Chaudary et al. 2016). This effect is even leveraged with female directors: women posit a 
considerable influence over the purchasing process, and they control about 80% of household 
spending, making the 81% of products and services purchases (Heffernan 2002). Women rep-
resentation on Boards will thus help corporations to have useful insights about customers’ 
behaviors and attitude, as well as to understand how to effectively address them (Gutner 2001).  
Lastly, women representation encourages not only social and environmental investments, but 
also their reporting. Indeed, female directors boost the effectiveness of firms’ monitoring (Ad-
ams & Ferreira 2009), which positively impacts both the company’s spending over sustainable 
investments and the evaluation of consistency over sustainability reporting. In support of this, 
Arayssi, Dah and Jizi (2016) expressed how, when women participation on Boards is low, 
firms’ reporting is perceived as less reliable and truthful: the presence of women on Boards 
strengthen the signaling capability and credibility of sustainability reporting.  
The empirical evidence thus justified and explained the benefits brought by female directors 
which, being wide and several, affect different sides of the broad concept of Corporate Sustain-
ability. Table 3 summarizes the main studies discussed in this paragraph and shows how their 
majority exhibits a positive connection between women representation and the different dimen-
sions of Corporate Sustainability. The researches illustrated in such Table have been considered 
as the starting point for the empirical study performed in such dissertation.  
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Table 3: Empirical studies on the relation between women and sustainability. 
 
2.4. The research questions 
Corporate Sustainability as well as Women representation have become a mantra for the 21st 
century. They can both be seen as sources of competitive advantage, which help firms to thrive 
and to outperform in the competitive arena. On one side, the concept of sustainability is one of 
the most debated in literature, and its consequences and effects have been widely discussed 
starting from the second half of the last century. On the other one, the women matter is a more 
recent phenomenon, justified by the majority of researches which concentrate starting from the 
new century.  
Especially in the latest years, several studies have tried to understand the connection which lies 
between women representation and Corporate Sustainability, discovering multiple implications 
and facets behind the same concept. Results are not univocal, quite the contrary, they include 
aspects and findings which differ from one research to the other. The doubtful literature over 
some dimensions of such topic is the reason why this study has been developed with the aim of 
testing the effectiveness of the positive linkage between women representation on Boards and 
responsible policies, focusing on the most uncertain results discussed in literature.   
Authors Year Country Analyzed relation Findings
Arayssi, Dah & Jizi 2016 UK Women representation and ESG disclosure Positive relation
Byron & Post 2016 20 countries
Women representation on firm's Board and corporate 
social performance
Positive relation
Women on Boards and stakeholder orientation Positive relation
Women managers with higher education and CSR Positive relation
Women managers with interpersonal leadership style 
and CSR
Positive relation
Gender equality in a country and proportion of 
companies with at least 3 women on the BoD
Positive relation
Women representation and levels of CSR Positive relation
Women on Boards and economic growth Positive relation
Women and social responsiveness Positive relation
Women and environmental quality Null relation
Women CEOs and environmental initiatives Null relation
Women representation and environmental initiatives Positive relation
Female directors and economic sustainability Null relation
Female directors and environmental sustainability Null relation
Female directors and social sustainability Positive relation












Hussain, Rigoni & 
Orij
2011Galbreath
Glass, Cook & 
Ingersoll
2016 US
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Before explaining the hypotheses underlying the analysis performed, it is worthwhile to stress 
how female directors bring several benefits to organizations, not only bounded to the ethical 
side, but enlarged toward the economic and financial one. Nevertheless, the impacts of women 
representation over economic and financial performance are already widely discussed in liter-
ature: it was thus considered more valuable to focus on the sustainability edge of female 
directors. Moreover, the effects of women representation over Corporate Social Performance is 
roughly five times greater than the impacts over economic and financial performance. This 
happens because individual directors, as well as the Board as a whole, tend to have more control 
over firms’ ethical side rather than over the financial one (Byron & Post 2016).  
The discussion presented in the above paragraphs lead to the development of the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Women representation on BoDs is positively related to Corporate Sustainability. 
 
The scrutiny of the literature over such topic highlighted how the greatest uncertainty about the 
positive relation between female directors and sustainability is tied to the environmental side. 
Indeed, while most of studies identified a beneficial influence of women over social perfor-
mance, results about such effects over environmental performance generate a mix evidence. 
Scholars tried to explain such divergence considering that men – with respect to women – have 
more decision-making experience and background connected to science and engineering, as 
they are more likely to have degrees in technical disciplines (Singh, Terjesen & Vinnicombe 
2008). Boards and corporations thus perceive women as having less experience in environmen-
tal matters than men, favoring inputs from male directors over such topic, and discounting those 
from female ones (Galbreath 2011). With the aim of identifying whether the positive relation 
is tougher when discussing social rather than environmental issues, Hypothesis 2 has been de-
veloped as in the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between Women representation on Boards and Corporate Sus-
tainability is stronger on the social rather than on the environmental side. 
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It’s not only the Board of Directors which plays a fundamental role in crafting the strategy and 
in integrating social and environmental matters into corporate goals: the Chief Executive Of-
ficer is increasingly becoming the focal point for the implementation of sustainable policies. 
Indeed, the CEO’s personality, characteristics and values direct the actions of managers, thus 
defining which behaviors to favor and which ones to neglect. This means that also Corporate 
Sustainability depends on the nature of firm’s CEO, and on his or her inclinations toward re-
sponsible policies (Christensen, Mackey & Whetten 2014). Moreover, the CEO imposes a 
stronger pressure on corporations – with respect to the BoD – toward the conformance to his or 
her own values (Wally & Baum 1994): we should thus expect the positive effects over sustain-
ability to be greater when the CEO is a woman. Indeed, it is well known that women have 
higher attitudes toward sustainability, as their own values tend to be more aligned with ethical 
ones. Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with women CEOs are more inclined toward Corporate Sustainability.  
 
The way in which such three hypotheses have been tested is described in Chapter 3, which 
highlights the methodology of the study, the sample and the variables considered. Results are 
discussed in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 considers the managerial implications of the outcomes 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY OF THE EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
3.1. The methodology of the study 
In order to test the research questions highlighted in Chapter 2, it has been performed a quanti-
tative analysis based on original survey data. In the following paragraphs is provided a brief 
description of the process pursued to select and gather data, as well as of the analyses per-
formed. Here is clarified the methodology enforced for conducting the whole study, from the 
sample choice to the development of the regression models.  
The Chapter is divided into two steps, which relate to the analyses performed to test the hypoth-
eses developed. The first step refers to a wide and generic analysis undertaken to have a global 
overview over the link between women and sustainability, comparing sustainable and non-sus-
tainable firms. It has the main aim of understanding the effects that women representation has 
over the sustainability propensity of firms, intended as their willingness to commit to sustaina-
ble practices. The second step digs dipper into the issue and focuses only on the sample of 
sustainable firms, comparing firms with different levels of sustainability, trying to measure the 
sustainability intensity of firms.  
In both cases, it is first of all explained the sample selection and the way in which data have 
been collected. Secondly, the dependent and independent variables employed to develop the 
empirical models are described, with a specific focus on the reasoning behind their choice based 
on the theoretical framework already developed. In the last part of the Chapter, the sample is 
examined in detail, for understanding how companies are distributed on the basis of some key 
variables, and for identifying the structure of the sample.  
Table 4 summarizes the concepts of sustainability propensity and of sustainability intensity, 
specifying how they have been employed for the empirical analyses performed and how they 
have been measured.  
Table 4: Definition of sustainability propensity and intensity. 
 
Figure 2: B Impact Score distribution of participating companies.Table 5: Definition of sustainability propensity 
and intensity. 
 
Figure 3: B Impact Score distribution of participating companies.  
Source: https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
Table 6: Sample size and composition for the first-step analysis.Figure 4: B Impact Score distribution of partici-
pating companies.Table 7: Definition of sustainability propensity and intensity. 
 
Figure 5: B Impact Score distribution of participating companies.Table 8: Definition of sustainability propensity 
Definition The sample The measure Level of analysis
Sustainability 
Propensity
The committment or not of 
companies toward 
sustainability
Sustainable firms a d non-
sustainabile firms
Being a Certified B 





The level of sustainability 
pursued by companies Sustainable firms B Impact Scores Step two
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3.2. The B Corp Framework 
As summarized in Table 4, the proxy employed to identify if and to what extent firms are sus-
tainable is related to the achievement of the B Corp Certification, released by the B Lab1. B 
Lab is a nonprofit organization which operates globally, having the main goal of inducing com-
panies to help address society’s greatest challenges, like wealth inequality or climate change. It 
collaborates with companies and institutions across all sectors of society, and it leads companies 
to compete to be the best for the world, for the people who live in and for the environment. This 
Certification has already been adopted in other academic publications (Grimes, Gehman & Cao 
2018) as a proxy for sustainability, and it is a nice fit for the research questions addressed in 
this dissertation. Additionally, also Benefit Corporations have been considered, being a new 
company form which is so far available just in the USA, Colombia, Puerto Rico and Italy. The 
notions of Certified B Corporations and Benefit Corporations are not substitutable, as will be 
discussed in the following.  
 
3.2.1. Certified B Corporations and Benefit Corporations 
Certified B Corporations – or B Corps – are firms which get the B Corp Certification, given 
they can prove to meet the highest standards of social and environmental performance, trans-
parency and accountability. Such businesses use their profits and growth opportunities for 
generating positive impacts over their employees as well as over the community and the envi-
ronment in their broader sense. For obtaining the B Corp Certification, firms need to compute 
the B Impact Assessment, “the most credible tool a company can use to measure its impact on 
its workers, community, environment, and customers”, and achieve at least 80 out of 200 avail-
able points of the Overall B Impact Score, the total score provided by B Lab which measure the 
impacts that a business has on all of its stakeholders. To ensure that once firms get the Certifi-
cation they continue to engage with their stakeholders, the Certification last three years and, 
after that time, firms must update their assessment. Moreover, B Corps share their B Impact 
Assessment on their B Impact Reports, as well as on the website https://bcorporation.eu/direc-
tory, in which it is possible to find the individual score of each company.  
Benefit Corporations do not fill for obtaining the B Corp Certification, and do not estimate their 
B Impact Score. A Benefit Corporation is a legal form of company that integrates the profit-
making activity with one or more social and environmental goals, which must be included in 
 
1 The information exposed in such paragraph are available at the websites https://bcorporation.eu and http://www.so-
cietabenefit.net  
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the corporate statute. This means that Benefit Corporations voluntarily pursue, alongside the 
profit objective, also a mutual benefit one, intended as aims which favor the workers, the com-
munity or the environment. To this end, executives need to balance shareholders’ claims and 
stakeholders’ needs, appointing a manager accountable for company’s reporting, transparency 
and sustainability. Benefit Corporations thus go beyond the short-term model of profits, being 
aware that for allowing the creation of the long-term value for all the interested parties, they 
have to include in their mission as well as in their statute also nonprofit goals. Lastly, while any 
for profit company in any country can get the B Corp Certification, the Benefit Corporation 
form is accessible only in 34 countries of USA, in Colombia, Puerto Rico and Italy.  
 
3.2.2. The B Impact Scores 
As stated before, to become a Certified B Corporation – or a B Corp – companies need to reach 
at least 80 out of the 200 points available of the Overall B Impact Score. Such total score is 
divided into five sub-categories: Governance Company Score, Workers Company Score, Com-
munity Company Score, Environment Company Score and Customers Company Score. For the 
purposes of this analysis, four scores have been considered: 
• the Overall B Impact Score, as a proxy for measuring the general level of Corporate Sus-
tainability of firms; 
• the Community Company Score and the Workers Company Score, as proxies for the level 
of social sustainability; 
• the Environment Company Score, as a proxy for the level of environmental sustainability. 
Moreover, the B Impact Scores have allowed to acquire all the information needed about the 
three dimensions of sustainability employed in this study.  
Indeed, to verify whether women representation on Boards is positively related to sustainability 
and whether such effect is more positive when the CEO is a woman, the dependent variable 
employed is the Overall B Impact Score, the comprehensive rating provided by B Lab. This 
total score embodies the impacts of a business on all of its stakeholders, namely its workers, 
suppliers, the community and the environment in their broader sense. Thus, the Overall B Im-
pact Score is the total rating which includes all the other sub-scores (Governance, Workers, 
Community, Environment and Customers Company Score), and it is employed as a proxy for 
the general level of Corporate Sustainability of the companies in the sample.  
The Overall B Impact Score goes from 0 to 200, but for becoming a B Corp, the company has 
to score at least 80 out of the 200 points available. Nonetheless, any positive score is a good 
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score, because any score higher than zero discloses how the firm is doing something positive 
for the society and the environment in which it operates. Most of the companies which complete 
the B Impact Assessment score between 40 and 100 points, and their distribution is shown in 










The threshold for getting the Certification is set at 80 points. This is because – since each impact 
area (Workers, Community, Environment…) weights roughly 40 points – achieving 80 as a 
total score would mean that the company has to excel in more than one area to become a B 
Corp. Thus, B Lab wants to provide the Certification only to companies that have positive in-
fluence over multiple impact areas, rather than just one.  
Moreover, to test whether the influence of women representation on Boards over Corporate 
Sustainability is stronger on the social rather than on the environmental side, three other scores 
are employed: Community Company Score, Workers Company Score and Environment Com-
pany Score.  
The Community Company Score measures the influence that the company subjected to the 
assessment has over its stakeholders in the broader scope of the term. It includes workers, sup-
pliers, distributors, nonprofit organizations and the society in general. The score is divided into 
five main areas: 
• job creation, aimed to understand how many new people the company hired and how many 
workers left the job or got fired; 
• diversity, developed to reckon the percentage of employees and directors who come from 
underrepresented communities (female, low-income communities, individual with disabil-
ities) and the differences in their wages; 
Figure 2: B Impact Score distribution of participating companies.  
Source: https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
Table 19: Sample size and composition for the first-step analysis.Figure 14: B Impact Score dis-
tribution of participating companies.  
Source: https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
Table 20: Sample size and composition for the first-step analysis. 
 
 
Table 21: The variables employed in the first-step analysis.Table 22: Sample size and composi-
tion for the first-step analysis.Figure 15: B Impact Score distribution of participating companies.  
Source: https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
Table 23: Sample size and composition for the first-step analysis.Figure 16: B Impact Score dis-
tribution of participating companies.  
Source: https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
Table 24: Sample size and composition for the first-step analysis. 
 
 
Table 25: The variables employed in the first-step analysis.Table 26: Sample size and composi-
tion for the first-step analysis. 
 
 
Table 27: The variables employed in the first-step analysis. 
 
Table 28: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis.Table 29: The variables em-
ployed in the first-step analysis.Table 30: Sample size and composition for the first-step analysis. 
 
 
Table 31: The variables employed in the first-step analysis.Table 32: Sample size and composi-
tion for the first-step analysis.Figure 17: B Impact Score distribution of participating companies.  
Source: https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
Table 33: Sample size and composition for the first-step analysis.Figure 18: B Impact Score dis-
tribution of participating companies.  
Source: https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
Table 34: Sample size and composition for the first-step analysis. 
 
 
Table 35: The variables employed in the first-step analysis.Table 36: Sample size and composi-
tion for the first-step analysis.Figure 19: B Impact Score distribution of participating companies.  
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• civic engagement and giving, intended to comprehend whether the company pursues some 
charitable giving practices, and to reckon the hours and resources dedicated to such habits; 
• local involvement, directed to identify whether the company avails of local workforce, local 
suppliers and local banks;  
• suppliers, distributors and products, focused to understand what kind of social and envi-
ronmental screening (if any) is performed by the company for selecting suppliers and 
distributors, and to esteem the percentage of materials or products that get certifications by 
third parties.  
The other proxy for social sustainability is the Workers Company Score, which assesses the 
firm’s contribution to its employees financial, physical, professional, and social well-being. 
Also such score is partitioned in five areas: 
• job growth, directed to reckon the number of new hired and of temporary workers, for 
understanding whether and how the company is increasing its workforce; 
• compensation and benefits, aimed to identify the advantages provided to employees in 
terms of promotions, monetary and non-monetary benefits; 
• employment practices, focused on understanding whether the firm’s hiring and workplace 
conditions are fair or not; 
• work environment, crafted to assess the management/workers communication, workers 
health and safety practices; 
• employee ownership, directed to calculate the percentage and the number of employees 
that have granted stock, stock options or stock equivalents in the company, thus to under-
stand how much of the company is owned by employees (different from executives).  
On the other side, the Environmental Company Score aims to assess the impacts that the com-
pany has over the environment, on the basis of its inputs, outputs and transformation processes. 
Here again, the score is divided into five areas, which allow us to better understand the compo-
sition of the overall environmental rating: 
• land, office and planet, aimed to identify whether the company has some green buildings 
(facilities certified to meet environmental requirements), if it follows recycling policies 
and if it implements some practices for reducing environmental footprints;   
• inputs, focused on understanding the level of usage of renewable resources, recycled or 
environmentally friendly products or packaging and on verifying the presence of monitor-
ing systems of energy usage;  
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• outputs, directed to comprehend the level of waste disposal, the level of gas emissions and 
the percentage of waste that are recycled or reused; 
• transportation, distribution and suppliers, crafted to evaluate the techniques or policies 
implemented (if any) for minimizing the environmental impact of the distribution channels 
and of the whole supply chain; 
• impact business model, intended to understand whether the company’s products or pro-
cesses are structured to restore or preserve the environment.  
 
3.3. Data collection 
The analyses performed to test the research questions are based on survey data, personally gath-
ered through online surveys distributed to Certified B Corporations and Benefit Corporations. 
The dissertation is part of the bigger project “New business models and social impact assess-
ment in sustainability paths for SMEs”2 – developed by a research group of the Department of 
Economic and Business Sciences “Marco Fanno” (DSEA) of the University of Padua – to which 
I participated.  
The initial population was composed of 167 Italian companies and 146 UK companies, namely 
all the B Corps active in these countries and the Benefit Corporations of Italy. The choice of a 
two-country analysis is a consequence of the common thinking that results of studies about the 
connection between women and sustainability are misleading when analyzing only one country, 
as the extent to which female directors influence Corporate Sustainability may be affected by 
country’s specificities (Rao & Tilt 2016). Moreover, Italy and UK have distinct positions over 
the women matter, as attested by the difference between the Global Gender Gap Index of these 
two countries. Such index considers gender equality in terms of economic participation, educa-
tional attainment, health and survival and political empowerment. Theoretically it should range 
from zero, synonymous of no gender equality, to one – total equality – even if practically it 
spans from the 0,499 of Yemen to the 0,858 of Iceland. While Italy is positioned seventieth in 
the global ranking with a score of 0,706, United Kingdom is fifteenth, with a score of 0,774 
(World Economic Forum 2018). 
The choice to consider two countries in the study here performed is doubly beneficial: it allows 
to avoid misleading results from the research while, at the same time, it gives us the opportunity 
to confirm or deny the idea that the relationship between women representation and Corporate 
 
2 Funded with ESF 2014 - 2020 (D.G.R. n. 1267 of 08/08/2017 by the Veneto Region) 
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Sustainability is more positive when studies are conducted in countries with higher gender par-
ity (Byron & Post 2016).  
From the initial sample of 313 companies, the first contact was by e-mail, which included the 
purpose of the questionnaire, the description of the project and the methodology of the study. 
The last specification was fundamental to explain to companies how their answers would be 
confidential and anonymous, clarifying that data would be processed only in aggregate form 
and for scientific purposes. Then, the second contact was by phone, a more direct contact 
needed to better explain the aim of the research personally to the party in charge for the Certi-
fication, and to gain greater participation of companies that are usually reluctant to reply to 
surveys sent by e-mail. For firms with no phone number available, the communication hap-
pened through social network, especially LinkedIn and Facebook. During the second contact, 
another e-mail was sent to firms willing to help, sometimes emailing directly to the person 
responsible for the Certification. Being an online survey and not a telephone one, the question-
naire was filled by the respondents. 
Data collection lasted three months, from July to September 2019, and has led to a final sample 
of 71 firms, of which 47 are Italian companies, and 24 are UK companies.  
 
3.3.1. The structure of the questionnaire 
As anticipated before, companies were asked to answer to a questionnaire, needed to collect 
data not available on AIDA or on companies’ websites. The questionnaire is nine pages long 
and divided into three sections, for a total of 31 questions.  
Section A includes 8 questions about the Business Model of the company, developed mainly 
for understanding what changes the firm had to face when becoming a B Corp and which insti-
tutions helped in this transformation process.  
Section B contains 10 questions formulated to comprehend the reasons why the company has 
certified as a B Corp and the consequences of the Certification from an economic, social and 
environmental point of view.  
Section C embodies 13 questions about some general characteristics of the enterprise, as its 
turnover, the number of employees or the sector in which it operates. In this Section is included 
the question of whether or not there are women in the top management of the company.  
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3.4. The empirical model of step one: sustainability propensity 
As anticipated before, the first-step of the empirical analysis provides a general understanding 
of the link between women and sustainability and aims to identify whether firms with women 
in their top management are more likely to act sustainably compared to firms with no women 
in the top positions.  
Firstly, are described the dependent, the independent and the control variables considered and 
the reasoning behind their choice; secondly the model employed to answer to such questions is 
outlined. 
 
3.4.1. The dependent variable: sustainable and non-sustainable firms 
To understand whether a company is sustainable or not, the B Corp Certification and the Benefit 
legal form have been chosen as the cut-off criteria: sustainable firms are thus intended as firms 
being either Certified B Corporations and/or Benefit Corporations. Thus, the dependent varia-
ble is represented by the event Sustainability, a dichotomous variable noted as one if the firm 
is sustainable – thus if it is a Certified B Corporation or a Benefit Corporation – as zero other-
wise.  
The sample of sustainable firms in this first-step analysis considers only Italian companies, thus 
the 47 Italian sustainable firms, as for UK ones no information were available about their size 
or performance. 
To develop the sample of non-sustainable firms, the 47 Italian companies – namely the sustain-
able firms – were the starting point. Indeed, using the database AIDA and the statistical software 
R, for each firm 5 different comparable companies have been identified. The process required 
different stages to be followed, which are then clarified.  
In a first moment, the 47 Italian companies were launched in the database AIDA, discovering 
that for four of them, no data were available. The sample of sustainable firms was thus reduced 
from 47 to 43 companies, because for such four companies it was not possible to find their 
comparables as there were no information about the sector in which they operate and about 
their economic and financial performance.  
Secondly, thanks to the data available on AIDA, a first screening was performed, selecting for 
each sustainable firm a list of comparable companies on the basis of the province and the sector 
in which the sustainable company operates3.   
 
3 Only active companies have been considered. 
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Lastly, employing the statistical software R, the propensity score matching command has been 
applied to such list of companies and, selecting the Return on Equity and the Total Assets as 
the variables to measure proximity, for each sustainable firm 5 comparable companies have 
been identified. 
Thus, in the sample of non-sustainable firms are included those companies that operate in the 
same region and in the same sector of the sustainable firms, and that have size and economic 
performance similar to them. The sample of non-sustainable companies is composed by 215 
Italian firms.  









3.4.2. The independent and control variables  
To predict the presence of women in the top management, two independent variables have been 
considered as proxies for women representation: the presence or absence of women in the Board 
of Directors of firms and the gender of the CEO.  
The variable Women on Boards is a dichotomous variable noted as one if there is at least one 
woman in the Board of Directors of the firm, as zero otherwise. While data about such variable 
for the sample of sustainable firms were furnished by the questionnaire, data for the sample of 
non-sustainable firms have been personally collected through AIDA. Looking at the “executive 
and managers” section of AIDA, if in the BoD it was written at least one female name, it has 
been inserted 1 in the database, and zero otherwise.  
The other proxy for women representation is the variable CEO gender, a dichotomous variable 
depicted as one if the CEO is a woman, as zero otherwise. The data for such variable have been 
personally collected through AIDA both for the sample of sustainable firms and for the sample 
FIRST STEP Sustainable firms Non-sustainable firms
Composition Certified B Corporations and Benefit Corporations
Companies similar to Sustainable 
firms in terms of:                   
Location  Province                  
Sector  Ateco Code 2007           
Size  Total Assets            
Performance  ROE
Sample size 47 (then reduced to 43 for missing data)
215 (5 comparables for each 
sustainable firm)
Country Italy Italy
SECOND STEP Sustainable firms
Composition Certified B Corporations
Sample Size
71 (then reduced to 57 
excluding Benefit 
Corporation)
Country Italy for 33 companies, UK for 24 companies
Table 5: Sample size and composition for the first-step analysis. 
 
Table 38: The variables employed in the first-step analysis.Table 39: Sample size and 
composition for the first-step analysis. 
 
 
Table 40: The variables employed in the first-step analysis. 
 
Table 41: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis.Table 42: The varia-




Table 44: The variables employed in the first- tep analysis.Table 45: Sample size and 
composition for the first-step analysis. 
 
 
Table 46: The variables employed in the first-step analysis. 
 
Table 47: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis.Table 48: The varia-
bles employed in the first-step analysis. 
 
Table 49: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 50: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustainability.Table 51: 
Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis.Table 52: The variables em-
ployed in the first-step analysis. 
 
Table 53: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis.Table 54: The varia-




Table 56: The variables employed in the first-step analysis.Table 57: Sample size and 
composition for the first-step analysis. 
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of non-sustainable firms. Looking at the “executive and managers” section of AIDA, if as Gen-
eral Manager it was written a female name it has been inserted 1 in the database, and zero 
otherwise. Nevertheless, for some companies no General Manager was indicated. In such cases 
some proxies have been employed: 
• if in the section “executives and managers” only the name of the Sole Administrator was 
reported, the Sole Administrator was considered as CEO; 
• if in the section “executives and managers” neither the name of the General Manager nor 
the name of the Sole Administrator was reported, the President of the Board of Directors 
was considered as CEO.  
Moreover, to control the result of the study, other variables have been included in the models 
as proxies for the main levers of sustainability. The control variables for such first-step analysis 
measure the organizational slack of firms, intended as the company’s size plus other economic 
and financial performance. To this aim, Total Assets, EBITDA and ROE have been included 
as controls in the regression models, as in the study of Glass, Cook and Ingersoll (2016).  
Various measures have been used in previous studies as a proxy for the firm size, nevertheless, 
Total Assets and Market Capitalization are the ones most extensively employed. Given that the 
firms of the sample are not listed, Total Assets have been exploited in such dissertation as proxy. 
Firm size is one of the most important control variable, since several studies highlighted how 
firms with larger size invest more in sustainability, given their larger impact on communities 
and the greater stakeholders’ pressure they grab (Arayssi, Dah & Jizi 2016).  
Waddock and Graves (1997) argued how also slack resources play a relevant role in defining 
responsible behaviors. This is because slack resources available from strong financial perfor-
mance provide to companies the potentialities to invest in social and environmental policies 
without compromising the economic and financial equilibria. Similarly to Galbreath (2011), 
slack resources are measured by EBITDA.  
The slack resources theory is thus strictly related to economic and financial performance of 
firms, supporting the idea that larger companies with better performance are more likely to 
correctly combine economic and social objectives. To test this idea – as in the research of Setó‐
Pamies (2015) – Return on Equity has been employed, because it reflects the operating effi-
ciency and the financial opportunities for future growth.  
All the variables employed in such first step analysis are described by Table 6, which highlights 
also their source of information. 
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3.4.3. The method: logistic models 
For answering the questions related to such first general analysis, thus to understand the effects 
that having a woman in the BoD or a woman as a CEO have on the sustainable side of compa-
nies, it has been employed the logistic model.  
The logistic regression is a statistical model employed to measure the probability of a certain 
event to happen, thus it is the appropriate regression model to conduct when the dependent 
variable is a dichotomous one. To understand the significance of the estimates of the parameters 
in the logistic model, as in the linear one, the P-value is employed. The P-value is compared to 
a confidence level α that represents the type 1 error: such error is set in default at 5%, but in 
some cases, it can be useful to considerer lower or higher values, respectively 1% and 10%. For 
a P-value smaller than the α level chosen, the estimate of a parameter of the model is statistically 
significant, for P-value greater than such level, the estimate is not significant. 
Model 1 considers only the dependent variable and one of the two independent variables, thus 
being depicted as follows: 
 
Sustainability = 	𝛽. + 𝛽0	𝑊𝑂𝐵𝑂𝐷	(𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝐸𝑂. 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) + 𝜀 
 
Table 6: The variables employed in the first-step analysis. 
 
Table 64: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis.Table 65: The variables employed in the first-step anal-
ysis. 
 
Table 66: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 67: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustainability.Table 68: Sample size and composition for the 
second-step analysis.Table 69: The variables employed in the first-step analysis. 
 
Table 70: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis.Table 71: The variables employed in the first-step anal-
ysis. 
 
Table 72: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 73: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustainability.Table 74: Sample size and composition for the 
second-step analysis. 
 
Table 75: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustainability. 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data available at https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
 
Table 76: The list of the dependent variables.Table 77: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustainabil-
ity.Table 78: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 79: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustainability.Table 80: Sample size and composition for the 
second-step analysis.Table 81: The variables employed in the first-step analysis. 
 
Table 82: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis.Table 83: The variables employed in the first-step anal-
ysis. 
 
Table 84: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 85: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustainability.Table 86: Sample size and composition for the 
second-step analysis.Table 87: T  variables employed in the first-step analysis. 
 
Table 88: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis.Table 89: The variables employed in the first-step anal-
ysis. 
Dependent variable Variable Type Description Source of information
Sustainability propensity Dummy
0 = sustainable firm,           
1 = non-sustainable firm
bcorporation.eu/directory
Independent variables Variable Type Description Source of information
Women on Boards Dummy
0 = no women,                    
1 = yes women
Questionnarie and AIDA
CEO gender Dummy
0 = male,                           
1 = female
AIDA
Control variables Variable Type Description Source of information
Total Assets Continuous Ln (Total Assets) AIDA
EBITDA Continuous EBITDA AIDA
ROE Continuous Net profit / Equity AIDA
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Model 2 adds to the first one the organizational slack of firms, thus their size and performance, 
resulting in the following regression model4: 
 
Sustainability = 	𝛽. + 𝛽0	𝑊𝑂𝐵𝑂𝐷	(𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝐸𝑂. 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) + 𝛽A	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +	𝛽H	𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴	
+	𝛽J	𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝜀 
 
The independent variables Women on Boards and CEO gender are employed alternatively in 
the regression models, to understand respectively whether women representation on Boards is 
positively related to sustainability – H1 – and whether such effect is persistent and greater when 
the CEO is a woman – H3.  
 
3.5.  The empirical models of step two: sustainability intensity 
The second step of the analysis performed goes dipper into the research questions, focusing 
only on the sample of sustainable firms. The sample of sustainable firms in the second-step 
analysis includes also UK companies, while excluding the 14 Benefit Corporations, those com-
panies for which, as they do not get the Certification, no data about the B Impact Scores were 
available, moving to a sample of 57 firms. Table 7 reports the sample size and composition of 








Thus, all companies in such sample are sustainable, the only difference among them is about 
the level with which they engage in sustainability, thus about their sustainability intensity. The 
sustainability intensity concerns the level of sustainability pursued by companies, and it tries to 
 
4 The continuous variables of the model – namely the Total Assets, EBITDA and ROE – have been winsorized at the 
95th percentile to limit the effect of outliers, and have been standardized in order to make comparable their distribution. 
Table 7: Sample size and composition for the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 90: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustaina-
bility.Table 91: Sample size and composition for the second-step 
analysis. 
 
Table 92: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustaina-
bility. 




Table 93: The list of the dependent variables.Table 94: Reasons to se-
lect the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustainability.Table 95: Sample 
size and composition for the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 96: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustaina-
bility.Table 97: Sample size and composition for the second-step 
analysis. 
 
Table 98: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustaina-
bility. 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data available at https://bimpac-
tassessment.net 
SECOND STEP Sustainable firms
Composition Certified B Corporations
Sample Size
71 (then reduced to 57 
excluding Benefit 
Corporations)
Country Italy for 33 companies, UK for 24 companies
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quantify in numerical terms their involvement in practices that favor the environment and the 
community. It is a more stringent analysis than the one performed in the first step, because it 
wants to understand not only if the presence of women in the Boards of companies lead them 
to operate sustainably, but also if female representation has effects over the level of sustaina-
bility pursued.  
 
3.5.1. The dependent variables 
To measure the sustainability intensity of firms, the B Impact Scores have been selected, and 













In order to build the dependent variable, the Overall B Impact Score has been considered as a 
proxy for the general level of Corporate Sustainability. The Overall B Impact Score ranges 
between 80 and 200 and, more precisely, the interval of such variable is from 80 to 126, as no 
company in the sample scores higher than 126. Secondly, the Community Company Score is 
employed as one of the proxies for social sustainability, and in the sample here considered it 
ranges from 10 to 83. The second proxy for social sustainability is the Workers Company Score, 
and in the sample of this dissertation, it ranges from 0 to 69. Lastly, to measure the level of 
environmental sustainability, the Environment Company Score is employed, and in the sample 
here considered it ranges from 4 to 62.  
Motivation Explanation
Comprehensive It covers everything from governance to supply chain
Independent Overseen by independent Standards Advisory Council
Transparent All questions and weightings visible to the public
Dynamic It changes based on size and sector of the company
Community based Most changes are based on user feedback
Positive There are no negative points on the assessment
Free Companies have not to pay to assess their B Impact score
Easy to use It is an online tool designed for SME
Confidential Answers and reports are only visible to B Lab, only reports are visible for most Certified B Corps
Comparable Across industry and size
Educational Aimed at making it easy for business owners and operators to improve their impact
Table 8: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustainability. 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data available at https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
 
Table 116: The list of the dependent variables.Table 117: Reasons to select the B Impact Score 
as a proxy for sustainability. 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data available at https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
 
Table 118: The list of the dependent variables. 
 
 
Table 119: The variables employed in the second-step analysis.Table 120: The list of the de-
pendent variables.Table 121: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustainability. 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data available at https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
 
Table 122: The list of the dependent variables.Table 123: R asons to select the B Impact Score 
as a proxy for sustainability. 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data available at https://bimpactassessment.net 
 
 
Table 124: The list of the dependent variables. 
 
 




Table 127: The variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 128: The eight T-tests developed.Table 129: The variables employed in the second-step 
analysis.Table 130: The list of the dependent variables. 
 
 
Table 131: The variables employed in the second-step analysis.Table 132: The list of the de-
pendent variables.Table 133: Reasons to select the B Impact Score as a proxy for sustainability. 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data available at https://bimpactassessment.net 
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3.5.2. The independent and control variables  
For understanding the relation between women and sustainability, two independent variables 
have been considered for the research: the presence or absence of women in the Board of Di-
rectors and the gender of the CEO of the firms subjected to the questionnaire. The variable 
Women on Boards is a dichotomous variable, depicted as one if there is at least one woman in 
the Board of Directors of the firm, as zero otherwise. For this parameter, the answer was pro-
vided by the questionnaire developed, in which there is a specific question dedicated to such 
matter – question 19: in your company are there women in the top management? The CEO 
gender is likewise a dichotomous variable noted as one if the CEO is a woman, as zero other-
wise. The data for such parameter have been collected through AIDA for Italian companies, 
and through LinkedIn and companies’ websites for English ones.  
To control the results of the study, some variables have been employed as proxies for the main 
levers of sustainability. The control variables of the model can be divided into two groups, and 
this separation is useful also for the regression models developed.  
On one side, there are the structural characteristics of firms, namely the business type, the group 
membership and the country of origin.  
Being a Family business can be a facilitator or an opposing force to sustainability. Indeed, some 
previous researches pointed out how family businesses – more than non-family businesses – 
feel more accountable for those stakeholders that are directly tied to the business itself, espe-
cially employees, suppliers and customers (Uhlaner, Van Goor-Balk & Masurel 2004). 
Moreover, the familiar configuration affects also the two independent variables, as in family 
firms gender diversity within the Board is greater than in non-family businesses (Barrett & 
Moores 2011). This are the reasons why the “family variable” has been introduced in this study, 
developing a dummy variable depicted as one if the firm is a family business, as zero otherwise.  
Table 9: The list of the dependent variables. 
 
 
Table 142: The variables employed in the second-step analysis.Table 143: The list of the dependent variables. 
 
 
Table 144: The variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 145: The eight T-tests developed.Table 146: The variables employed in the second-step analysis.Table 147: The list 
of the dependent variables. 
 
 
Table 148: The variables employed in the second-step analysis.Table 149: The list of the dependent variables. 
 
 
Table 150: The variables employed in the second-st p analysis. 
 
Table 151: The eight T-tests developed.Table 152: The variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 153: The eight T-tests developed. 
 
Graph 1: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43Table 154: The eight T-tests developed.Table 155: The 
variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 156: The eight T-tests developed.Table 157: The variables employed in the second-step analysis.Table 158: The list 
of the dependent variables. 
 
 
Table 159: The variables employed in the second-step analysis.Ta l  160: The list of the dependent variables.
 
 
Table 161: T e variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 162: The eight T-tests developed.Table 163: The variables employed i  the second-step analysis.Table 164: The list 
of the dependent variables. 
 
 
Table 165: The variables employed in the second-step analysis.Table 166: The list of the dependent variables. 
 
 
Table 167: The variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 168: The eight T-tests developed.Table 169: The variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 170: The eight T-tests developed. 
 
Graph 2: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43Table 171: The eight T-tests developed.Table 172: The 
variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 173: The eight T-tests developed.Table 174: The variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 175: The eight T-tests developed. 
 
Dependent variable Proxy for… Range of values
Ov rall B Impact Score Level of Corporate Sustainability From 80 to 126
Community Company Score Level of Social Sustainability From 10 to 83
Workers Company Score Level of Social Sustainability From 0 to 69
Environment Company Score Level of Environmental Sustainability From 4 to 62
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In the same way, we should expect that being Part of a group has an impact over sustainable 
policies. Indeed, firms inside the same cluster influence each other, especially if also the other 
companies of the group heavily invest in such practices. Here is studied such theoretical sen-
tence, trying to understand whether being part of a group positively influence sustainable 
performance or not, with a dummy variable noted as one if the company is part of a group, as 
zero otherwise.  
The last structural characteristic included in the model takes into account the Country of origin 
of firms. In fact, it is expected to have a stronger relation between women and sustainability in 
studies conducted in countries with higher gender parity, as demonstrated by Byron and Post 
(2016). In this study, the country with higher gender parity is the United Kingdom, thus it has 
been designed a dummy variable noted as one when the firm is from UK, as zero otherwise – 
thus when the firm is an Italian one.  
On the other side, another group of control variable is included into the organizational slack of 
firms, namely the Total Assets, EBITDA and ROE, whose theoretical framework has been al-
ready described in Paragraph 3.4.1., as the organizational slack of firms has been included also 
in the logistic model of step-one.  
Table 10 summarizes all the variables engaged in this second-step analysis, and their sources 
of information.  
 
Table 10: The variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 333: The eight T-tests developed.Table 334: The variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 335: The eight T-tests developed. 
 
Graph 52: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43Table 336: The eight T-tests developed.Table 337: The 
variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 338: The eight T-tests developed.Table 339: The variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 340: The eight T-tests developed. 
 
Graph 53: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43Table 341: The eight T-tests developed. 
 
Graph 54: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43 
 
 
Graph 55: Firms that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258Graph 56: The companies of the sample of sus-
tainable firms. N = 43Table 342: The eight T-tests developed. 
 
Graph 57: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43Table 343: The eight T-tests developed.Table 344: The 
variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
 
Table 345: The eight T-tests developed.Table 346: The variables employed in the second-step analysis. 
Dependent variables Variable Type Description Source of information
Overall B Impact Score Continuous Rating for corporate sustainability bcorporation.eu/directory
Community Company Score Continuous Rating for ocial sustainability bcorporation.eu/directory
Workers Company Score Continuous Rating for social sustainability bcorporation.eu/directory
Environment Company Score Continuous Rating for environmental sustainability bcorporation.eu/directory
Independent variables Variable Type Description Source of information
Women on Boards Dummy 0 = no women, 1 = yes women Questionnarie and AIDA
CEO gender Dummy 0 = male, 1 = female Linkedin and AIDA
Control variables Variable Type Description Source of information
Family business Dummy 0 = no family, 1 = family Questionnaire and AIDA
Part of a group Dummy 0 = no group, 1 = group Questionnaire and AIDA
Country Dummy 0 = Italy, 1 = UK bcorporation.eu/directory
Total Assets Continuous Ln (Total Assets) AIDA
EBITDA Continuous EBITDA AIDA
ROE Continuous Net profit / Equity AIDA
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3.5.3. Treating missing data 
Some respondents left empty the answers about the presence of absence of women in their 
corporate Boards, about their familiar type and the group membership. To avoid losing these 
observations, in a second step, and only for Italian companies, such data have been collected 
through AIDA.  
To identify women representation on Boards, the approach consisted in looking at the “execu-
tive and managers” section of AIDA, and if in the BoD there was written at least one female 
name it has been inserted 1 in the database, and zero otherwise.  
For the other two variables, the concept of control was fundamental to identify both family 
businesses and group of companies. It is well known how control may be exercised in different 
ways but, in the absence of other information, the acquisition of the absolute majority (50% + 
1) of shareholding is used as a proxy for control5. 
To understand whether the firm is or not a familiar business, looking at the “shareholders” 
section of AIDA, it was analyzed the name, surname and share of each shareholder, for identi-
fying the presence of familiar connections among them. This is because, typically, a family firm 
is identified as a company controlled and directed by one or more members of the family, maybe 
belonging to different generation (Baschieri 2014). They were considered familiar businesses, 
companies in which: 
• shareholders with the same surname own the control of the company (at least 50% + 1) or, 
• a single shareholder holds the whole capital or, 
• the principal shareholder (50% + 1) is another family business. 
In the same way, looking at the “shareholders” section of AIDA, it was identified also the 
membership of the company to a group or not. The definition of group includes likewise the 
concept of control, as being part of a group imposes companies to be controlled by another 
firm, which has the authority to intervene on the main organizational choices (Cainelli & 
Iacobucci 2005). Along this line, were considered part of a group companies whose shares (at 
least 50% + 1) were controlled by another company; and as not being part of a group otherwise.  
 
3.5.4. The methods: T-tests 
To have a first idea about the relation which lies between women representation and the level 
of Corporate Sustainability, some T-tests have been developed. The T-test compares the means 
 
5 Definition available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/statmanuals/files/KS-32-10-216-EN-C-EN.pdf  
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of two groups to determine whether those means are statistically different from each other. 
Precisely, it tests the null hypothesis: 
H0: μ1 = μ2 
H0 implies that there is no statistically significant difference between the means of the two 
groups. To understand whether to reject or not the null hypothesis, the P-value is considered: if 
the P-value is large, the data do not provide any reason to affirm that the means differ between 
the two groups, and thus it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis. On the contrary, if the 
P-value is small, the null hypothesis can be rejected. Three confidence level α can be employed 
to test the significance of the variable, respectively 1%, 5% and 10%. The null hypothesis is 
rejected when the P-value is smaller than the α level chosen.  
For the purposes of such dissertation, the proxies for identifying women representation are: 
• the presence or absence of women in the Board of Directors, with WOBOD = 0 if the 
company does not have at least one female director, and WOBOD = 1 if the company has 
one female director; 
• the gender of the CEO, with CEO = 0 when the CEO is a man, and CEO = 1 when the CEO 
is a woman.  
On the other side, the proxies for measuring the level of Corporate Sustainability are the Overall 
B Impact Score, the Community Company Score, the Workers Company Score and the Envi-
ronment Company Score. 
Eight different T-tests have been drafted, as shown in Table 11, and their results are exhibited 
in Chapter 4. 
 
Table 11: The eight T-tests developed. 
 
Graph 182: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43Table 445: The eight T-tests developed. 
 
Graph 183: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43 
 
 
Graph 184: Firms that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258Graph 185: The companies of the sample of 
sustainable firms. N = 43Table 446: The eight T-tests developed. 
 
Graph 186: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43Table 447: The eight T-tests developed. 
 
Graph 187: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43 
 
 
Graph 188: Firms that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258Graph 189: The companies of the sample of 
sustainable firms. N = 43 
 
 
WOBOD = 0 WOBOD = 1 CEO = 0 CEO = 1
Overall BIS Overall BIS Overall BIS Overall BIS
WOBOD = 0 WOBOD = 1 CEO = 0 CEO = 1
Community CS Community CS Community CS Community CS
WOBOD = 0 WOBOD = 1 CEO = 0 CEO = 1
Workers CS Workers CS Workers CS Workers CS
WOBOD = 0 WOBOD = 1 CEO = 0 CEO = 1
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3.5.5. The methods: multiple regression models 
Entering in the core analysis of the dissertation, three different multiple regression models have 
been designed to test the research questions. As anticipated before, the two independent varia-
bles have been used alternatively in the models.  
Model 3 has been developed considering only the dependent variable and one of the two inde-
pendent variables, thus being depicted as follows: 
 
Υ = 	𝛽. + 𝛽0	𝑊𝑂𝐵𝑂𝐷	(𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝐸𝑂. 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) + 𝜀 
 
Model 4 adds to the first one the structural characteristics of firms, thus the familiar type, the 
group membership and the country of origin. It follows that: 
 
Υ = 	𝛽. + 𝛽0	𝑊𝑂𝐵𝑂𝐷	(𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝐸𝑂. 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) +	𝛽A	𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽H	𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 + 𝛽J	𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀		 
 
Model 5 adds also the organizational slack of firms, thus their size and performance, resulting 
in the last regression model6. It’s relevant to stress how, for this model, have been included only 
Italian companies, as for UK ones no information were available about their size or perfor-
mance. Thus, the control variable Country has been excluded and the model results as follows: 
 
Υ = 	𝛽. + 𝛽0	𝑊𝑂𝐵𝑂𝐷	(𝑜𝑟	𝐶𝐸𝑂. 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) + 𝛽A	𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽H	𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 + 𝛽J	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+	𝛽T	𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 +	𝛽U	𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝜀		 
 
The dependent variable Υ changes on the basis of the hypothesis tested, thus switching among 
the Overall B Impact Score, the Community Company Score, the Workers Company Score and 
the Environment Company Score. As all the four dependent variables have a limited range of 
values, instead of employing a linear model, a Tobit one has been applied, which is a regression 
model designed to estimate the relationship between variables when the dependent variable is 
censored. 
 
6 The continuous variables of the model – namely the Total Assets, EBITDA and ROE – have been winsorized at the 
95th percentile to limit the effect of outliers, and have been standardized in order to make comparable their distribution. 
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3.6. Samples composition and description 
In these paragraphs the samples employed to test the research questions are examined in detail, 
understanding how companies are distributed considering some key variables. The main aim of 
this part of the Chapter is to provide a clear understanding of the composition of the samples 
considered in the different models employed, to avoid any king of misunderstanding.  
 
3.6.1. The sample of step one: sustainability propensity 
As anticipated in the previous paragraph, the analyses of the first step are focused only on Italian 
companies, divided into sustainable and non-sustainable firms. 
Focusing on the sample of sustainable firms, some of them are Benefit Corporations, others are 
Certified B Corporations, and the last group is made of companies that are at the same time 
Benefit Corporations and Certified B Corporations. Graph 1 shows the composition of the sam-
ple of sustainable firms: the majority of companies are at the same time Benefit Corporations 









Moving to the independent variables of the model, Graph 2 shows how the total sample is di-
vided when considering the variable Women on Boards. It is possible to notice how only the 
42% of the companies of the sample has at least one woman on their Boards, while the majority 



























Graph 1: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43 
 
 
Graph 382: Firms that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258Graph 
383: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43 
 
 
Graph 384: Firms that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258 
 
Graph 385: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258Graph 386: Firms 
that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258Graph 387: The companies 
of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43 
 
 
Graph 388: Firms that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258Graph 
389: The companies of the sample of sustainable firms. N = 43 
 
 
Graph 390: Firms that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258 
 
Graph 391: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258Graph 392: Firms 
that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258 
 
Graph 393: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 487: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables.Graph 394: Firms that 
have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258Graph 395: Firms that have and do not have 
women in their Boards. N = 258 
 








In the same way, considering the other proxy for female representation, thus the CEO gender, 
Graph 3 highlights how the majority of the firms of the sample have a man CEO: only the 21% 









3.6.2.  The sample of step two: sustainability intensity 
The analyses of the second step are focused only on the sample of sustainable firms.  
Starting from the 47 Italian sustainable companies, 24 UK companies have been added to the 
sample of sustainable firms, thus moving to a sample size of 71 companies. Nevertheless, 14 
observations needed to be excluded as they refer to Benefit Corporations – companies for which 
no data about the B Impact Scores were available – thus moving to a final sample of 57 firms.  
Moving to the variables considered in the empirical models, Table 12 highlights the main de-






















Graph 2: Firms that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258 
 
Graph 574: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258Graph 575: Firms 
that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258 
 
Graph 576: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 537: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables.Graph 577: Firms that 
have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258Graph 578: Firms that have and do not 
have women in their Boards. N = 258 
 
Graph 579: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258Graph 580: Firms 
that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258 
 
Graph 581: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 538: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables.Graph 582: Firms that 
have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 539: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 540: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables.Table 541: Descriptive statis-
tics of the continuous variables.Graph 583: Firms that have a man or a woman as a 
CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 542: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables.Graph 584: Firms that 
have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258Graph 585: Firms that have and do not 
have women in their Boards. N = 258 
 
Graph 586: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258Graph 587: Firms 
that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258 
 
Graph 588: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 543: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables.Graph 589: Firms that 
have a m n or a wom n as a CEO. N = 258Graph 590: Firms that have and do not 
have women in their Boards. N = 258 
 
Graph 591: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258Graph 592: Firms 
that have and do not have women in their Boards. N = 258 
 
Graph 593: Firms tha  av  a man or a woman a  a CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 544: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables.Graph 594: Firms that 
have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 545: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 546: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables.Table 547: Descriptive statis-
tics of the continuous variables.Graph 595: Firms that have a man or a woman as a 
CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 548: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables.Graph 596: Firms that 



















Graph 3: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 657: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables.Graph 696: Firms that 
have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 658: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 659: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables.Table 660: Descriptive statis-
tics of the continuous variables.Graph 697: Firms that have a man or a woman as a 
CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 661: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables.Graph 698: Firms that 
have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 662: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 663: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables.Table 664: Descriptive statis-
tics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 665: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 
 
Graph 699: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54Table 666: De-
scriptive statistics of the dummy variables.Table 667: Descriptive statistics of the 
continuous variables. 
 
Table 668: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables.Table 669: Descriptive statis-
tics of the continuous variables.Graph 700: Firms that have a man or a woman as a 
CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 670: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables.Graph 701: Firms that 
have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 258 
 
Table 671: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 672: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables.Table 673: Descriptive statis-
tics of the continuous variables.Graph 702: Firms that have a man or a woman as a 
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Given the statistics shown in Table 13, some graphs have been designed for allowing a better 
understanding of how variables are distributed. All the graphs exclude the NA, thus those ob-
servations for which no data were available.  
Starting from the independent variable Women on Boards, Graph 4 shows the number of com-
panies that have in their top management at least a woman director. The majority of companies 
have female in their Boards: only the 26% of the sample has not opted for women representa-








Table 12: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 817: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables.Table 818: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 819: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 
 
Graph 778: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54Table 820: Descriptive statistics of the dummy varia-
bles.Table 821: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 822: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables.Table 823: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 824: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 
 
Graph 779: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54Table 825: Descriptive statistics of the dummy varia-
bles. 
 
Graph 780: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54 
 
Graph 781: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56Graph 782: Firms that have and do not have female direc-
tors. N = 54Table 826: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 
 
Graph 783: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54Table 827: Descriptive statistics of the dummy varia-
bles.Table 828: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 829: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables.Table 830: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 831: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 
 
Graph 784: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54Table 832: Descriptive statistics of the dummy varia-
bles.Table 833: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 834: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables.Table 835: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. 
 
Table 836: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 
 
Graph 785: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54Table 837: Descriptive statistics of the dummy varia-
bles. 
 
Graph 786: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54 
 
Graph 787: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56Graph 788: Firms that have and do not have female direc-
tors. N = 54Table 838: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 
 
Graph 789: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54Table 839: Descriptive statistics of the dummy varia-
bles. 
 
Graph 790: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54 
 
Graph 791: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56Graph 792: Firms that have and do not have female direc-
tors. N = 54 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 
 
Graph 909: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54Table 928: Descriptive statistics of the dummy varia-
bles. 
 
Graph 910: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54 
 
Graph 911: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56Graph 912: Firms that have and do not have female direc-
tors. N = 54Table 929: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 
 
Graph 913: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54Table 930: Descriptive statistics of the dummy varia-
bles. 
 
Graph 914: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54 
 
Graph 915: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56Graph 916: Firms that have and do not have female direc-
tors. N = 54 
 
Graph 917: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56 
 
Graph 918: Family and non-family businesses. N = 51Graph 919: Firms that have a man or a oman as a CEO. N = 
56Graph 920: Firms that have and do not have fe ale directors. N = 54 
 
r  921: ir s t at a e a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56Graph 922: Firms that have and do n t have female direc-
tors. N = 54Table 931: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 
 
Graph 923: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54Table 932: Descriptive statistics of the dummy varia-
bles. 
 
Graph 924: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54 
 
r  925: ir s t at a e a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56Graph 926: Firms that have and do n t have female direc-
tors. N = 54Table 933: Descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 
 
Graph 927: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54Table 934: Descriptive statistics of the dummy varia-
bles. 
 























Graph 4: Firms that have and do not have female directors. N = 54 
 
Graph 1120: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56Graph 1121: Firms 
that have and do not have female directors. N = 54 
 
Graph 1122: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56 
 
Graph 1123: Family and non-family businesses. N = 51Graph 1124: Firms that have 
a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56Graph 1125: Firms that have and do not have fe-
male directors. N = 54 
 
Graph 1126: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56Graph 1127: Firms 
that have and do not have female dir ctors. N = 54 
 
Graph 1128: Firms that have a man or  woman as a CEO. N = 56 
 
DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES
Variable # Observations = 0 # Observations = 1 # Observations = NA # Observations 
WOBOD 14 40 3 57
CEO gender 41 15 1 57
Family 39 12 6 57
Group 40 11 6 57
Country 33 24 0 57
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
Variable Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum # Observations
Overall BIS 92,246 11,927 80 126 57
Community CS 28,877 13,037 10 83 57
Workers CS 26,292 8,928 0 69 48
Enviroment CS 17,439 13,359 4 62 57
Total Assets 4.341.618 10.809.297 21.829 58.615.045 30
EBITDA 261.845 477.195 -592.266 1.677.436 30
ROE 0,36 63,18 -207,07 89,90 29
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The other independent variable analyzes the gender of the CEO, and Graph 5 identifies a curi-
ous aspect. Despite the majority of companies have at least one woman in the BoD, things 
change when considering the Chief Executive Officer. Indeed, only the 28% of the companies 
have a woman CEO, while the greatest part – 72% – have a man CEO. The sample is made of 









Moving to the structural characteristics of firms, only a narrow part of the sample – the 24% – 
are family businesses, while the majority are non-familiar companies. This is shown in Graph 
6, which highlights also how the sample for such dummy variable is of 51 firms, as for six of 









Consistent with what just stated, only the 22% of the companies of the sample are part of a 
group: the greatest part of firms are not part of a group, as demonstrated in Graph 7. Also in 























Graph 6: Family and non-family businesses. N = 51 
 
Graph 1604: Firms that are and are not part of a group. N = 51Graph 1605: Family 
and non-family businesses. N = 51 
 
Graph 1606: Firms that are and are not part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1607: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57Graph 1608: Firms 
that are and are not part of a group. N = 51Graph 1609: Family and non-family busi-
nesses. N = 51 
 
Graph 1610: Firms that are and are not part of a group. N = 51Graph 1611: Family 
and non-family businesses. N = 51 
 
Graph 1612: Firms that are and are not part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1613: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57Graph 1614: Firms 
that are and are not part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1615: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 1616: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258Graph 
1617: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57Graph 1618: Firms that are 
























Graph 5: Firms that have a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56 
 
Graph 1362: Family and non-family businesses. N = 51Graph 1363: Firms that have 
a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56 
 
Graph 1364: Family and non-family businesses. N = 51 
 
Graph 1365: Firms that are and are not part of a group. N = 51Graph 1366: Family 
and non-family businesses. N = 51Graph 1367: Firms that have a man or a woman as 
a CEO. N = 56 
 
Graph 1368: Family and non-family businesses. N = 51Graph 1369: Firms that have 
a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56 
 
Graph 1370: Family and non-family businesses. N = 51 
 
Graph 1371: Firms that are and are not part of a group. N = 51Graph 1372: Family 
and non-family businesses. N = 51 
 
Graph 1373: Firms that are and are not part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1374: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57Graph 1375: Firms 
that are and are not part of a group. N = 51Graph 1376: Family and non-family busi-
nesses. N = 51 
 
Graph 1377: Firms that are and are not part of a group. N = 51Graph 1378: Family 
and non-family businesses. N = 51Graph 1379: Firms that have a man or a woman as 
a CEO. N = 56 
 
Graph 1380: Family and non-family businesses. N = 51Graph 1381: Firms that have 
a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56 
 
Graph 1382: Family and non-family businesses. N = 51 
 
Graph 1383: Firms that are and are not part of a group. N = 51Graph 1384: Family 
and non-family businesses. N = 51Graph 1385: Firms that have a man or a woman as 
a CEO. N = 56 
 
Graph 1386: Family and non-family businesses. N = 51Graph 1387: Firms that have 
a man or a woman as a CEO. N = 56 
 
Graph 1388: Family and non-family businesses. N = 51 
 
Graph 1389: Firms that are and are not part of a group. N = 51Graph 1390: Family 
and non-family businesses. N = 51 









Lastly, it’s relevant to identify the country of origin of companies, that can be either Italy or 
UK. Companies are distributed as shown in Graph 8, which highlights how the majority of 
companies are Italian: the 58% of the sample is composed of Italian companies, the 42% of 










The variables and the samples described in such Chapter are the starting point for testing the 
research questions, which are verified employing the T-tests and the regression models. A com-
plete analysis of the results obtained is performed in Chapter 4, which concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of the discoveries.  
  
Graph 8: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 2076: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to 
WOBOD. N = 258Graph 2077: Country of origin of the firms of 
the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 2078: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to 
WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 2079: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO 
gender. N = 258Graph 2080: Distribution of Sustainability condi-
tioned to WOBOD. N = 258Graph 2081: Country of origin of the 
firms of the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 2082: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to 
WOBOD. N = 258Graph 2083: Country of origin of the firms of 
the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 2084: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to 
WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 2085: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO 
gender. N = 258Graph 2086: Distribution of Sustainability condi-
tioned to WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 2087: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO 
gender. N = 258 
 
 
Table 971: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when 
WOBOD = 0Graph 2088: Distribution of Sustainability condi-
tioned to CEO gender. N = 258Graph 2089: Distribution of 
























Graph 7: Firms that are and are not part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1845: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57Graph 1846: Firms 
that are and are not part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1847: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 1848: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258Graph 
1849: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57Graph 1850: Firms that are 
and are not part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1851: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57Graph 1852: Firms 
that are and are not part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1853: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 1854: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258Graph 
1855: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 1856: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 1857: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 
258Graph 1858: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 
258Graph 1859: Coun y of rigin of he firms of the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 1860: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258Graph 
1861: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57Graph 1862: Firms that are 
and are no  part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1863: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57Graph 1864: Firms 
that are and are not part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1865: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 1866: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258Graph 
1867: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57Graph 1868: Firms that are 
and are not part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1869: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57Graph 1870: Firms 
that are and are not part of a group. N = 51 
 
Graph 1871: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 1872: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258Graph 
1873: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57 
 
Graph 1874: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 1875: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 
258Graph 1876: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 
258Graph 1877: Country of origin of the firms of the sample. N = 57 
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive analyses 
After having described the methodology pursued to test the hypotheses underlying the disser-
tation, this Chapter starts with some descriptive analyses of the variables employed for the 
empirical models. It focuses on identifying the differences between companies that have at least 
one female director and companies with all male directors, and on finding the differences be-
tween firms with men and women CEOs.  
Afterwards, to understand whether such discrepancies are significant or not, some tests are per-
formed over the sample of sustainable and non-sustainable firms, and over the four B Impact 
Scores (Overall, Environment, Community and Workers), considering the presence of women 
on Boards and the gender of the CEO as proxies for female representation. 
Moving to the empirical methods, the different regression models are applied to the data col-
lected, with the aim of testing the relation which lies between women representation and 
sustainable performances. Results are then discussed, with a specific reference to the research 
questions of the study. 
 
4.1.1. Step one: sustainability propensity 
Starting from the descriptive statistics of the first-step analysis, the sample of sustainable firms 
and the sample of non-sustainable firms have been compared on the basis of the variables 
Women on Boards and CEO gender, to get a first insights of the differences which lie between 
the two groups. 
Graph 9 highlights how in the sample of sustainable firms the majority of companies have at 
least one female director, while the situation is the opposite when considering the sample of 
non-sustainable firms, in which it is greater the number of firms that do not have women on 
Boards compared to those that opt for female representation. As a proof of that, while in the 
sample of sustainable firms the 75% of companies have at least one woman in the BoD, in the 













Results are completely different when considering the variable CEO gender, as in this case – 
regardless the sustainability or non-sustainability of firms – in both groups the companies with 
a woman CEO are less compared to the companies with a man CEO, as shown in Graph 10. At 
the same time, in the sample of non-sustainable firms only the 22% of companies have a woman 
CEO, and things do not change when considering the sample of sustainable firms, in which 









4.1.2. Step two: sustainability intensity 
Moving to the second-step analysis, the descriptive statistics have been divided between con-
tinuous and dichotomous variables, separating for the presence or absence of women in the 
Board of Directors. This means that, considering the variable Women on Boards, one group is 
made by those companies that do not have a female director (WOBOD = 0), and the other group 
























0 = No women on BoD
1 = Yes women on BoD
Graph 9: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 2268: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258Graph 2269: Distribution of 
Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 2270: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258 
 
 
Table 1021: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0Graph 2271: Distribution of 
Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258Graph 2272: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to 
WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 2273: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258Graph 2274: Distribution of 
Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 2275: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258 
 
Table 1022: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0Graph 2276: Distribution of 
Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258 
 
 
Table 1023: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 1024: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1Table 1025: Descriptive statis-
tics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0Graph 2277: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to 
CEO gender. N = 258 
 
 
Table 1026: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0Graph 2278: Distribution of 
Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258Graph 2279: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to 
WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 2280: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258Graph 2281: Distribution of 
Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 2282: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258 
 
Table 1027: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0Graph 2283: Distribution of 
Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258Graph 2284: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to 
WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 2285: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258Graph 2286: Dis ribution of
Sustainability conditioned to WOBOD. N = 258 
 
Graph 2287: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258 
 
Table 1028: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0Graph 2288: Distribution of 
Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258 
 
 

























0 = Man CEO
1 = Woma  CEO
Graph 10: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258 
 
Table 1141: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0Graph 2390: Distribution of 
Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258 
 
 
Table 1142: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 1143: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1Table 1144: Descriptive statis-
tics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0Graph 2391: Distribution of Sustainability conditioned to 
CEO gender. N = 258 
 
 
Table 1145: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0Graph 2392: Distribution of 
Sustainability conditioned to CEO gender. N = 258 
 
 
Table 1146: Descriptive statistics of continuous vari les when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 1147: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1Table 1148: Descriptive statis-
tics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 1149: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2393: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1150: Descriptive sta-
tistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1Table 1151: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables 
when WOBOD = 0 
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On the basis of those continuous variables, it can be noticed that the means between the two 
groups do not seem to change significantly when considering the sustainability scores of the B 
Lab, except for the Community Company Score, as it seems that having women in corporate 
Boards has a positive effects over this rating.  
Moreover, companies that have female directors in their Boards seem to be bigger compared to 
firms with no women directors: considering the variable Total Assets, the mean of companies 
with women on Boards is twice the mean of firms that do not have women on Boards. Further-
more, they have higher EBITDA (303.795 vs 146.512) but lower ROE (-3,90 vs 11,54). 
Nonetheless, considering only the means of the variables it is not possible to say a priori that 
such differences are or are not statistically significant. 
Moving to the qualitative variables, the Graph 11 relates the dichotomous variable Women on 
Boards with another dummy variable – Family Business – showing how, regardless of the type 
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES N = 40
Variable Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum # Observations
Overall BIS 91,475 11,910 80 126 40
Community CS 29,675 14,088 10 83 40
Workers CS 26,091 10,230 0 69 33
Enviroment CS 17,900 12,860 5 49 40
Total Assets 4.940.338 12.359.586 21.829 58.615.045 22
EBITDA 303.795 545.835 -592.266 1.677.436 22
ROE -3,90 71,34 -207,47 89,90 21
WOBOD = 1
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES N = 14
Variable Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum # Observations
Overall BIS 94,714 12,572 81 116 14
Community CS 25,500 5,075 13 47 14
Workers CS 26,385 9,288 19 35 13
Enviroment CS 17,071 16,146 4 62 14
Total Assets 2.695.136 4.629.294 105.148 13.252.690 8
EBITDA 146.512 169.963 -45.363 459.678 8
ROE 11,54 35,09 -54,25 71,63 8
WOBOD = 0
Table 14: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 1301: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1Table 1302: Descriptive statistics of continu-
ous variables when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 13 3: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2472: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1304: Descriptive statistics of continu-
ous variables when WOBOD = 1Table 1305: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 1306: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1Table 1307: Descriptive statistics of continu-
ous variables when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 1308: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2473: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1309: Descriptive statistics of continu-
ous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2474: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2475: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2476: Distribution of Family Business 
conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1310: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2477: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1311: Descriptive statistics of continu-
ous variables when WOBOD = 1Table 1312: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 1313: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1Table 1314: Descriptive statistics of continu-
ous variables when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 1315: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2478: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1316: Descriptive statistics of continu-
ous variables when WOBOD = 1Table 1317: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 1318: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1Table 1319: Descriptive statistics of continu-
ous variables when WOBOD = 0 
 
Table 1320: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2479: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1321: Descriptive statistics of continu-
ous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2480: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2481: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2482: Distribution of Family Business 
conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1322: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2483: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1323: Descriptive statistics of continu-
ous variables when WOBOD = 1 
Table 15: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2602: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1413: Descriptive statistics of contin-
uous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2603: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2604: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2605: Distribution of Family Business 
conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1414: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2606: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1415: Descriptive statistics of contin-
uous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2607: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2608: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2609: Distribution of Family Business 
conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2610: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2611: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54Graph 2612: Distribution of Part of a group condi-
tioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2613: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2614: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2615: Distribution of Family Business 
conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1416: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2616: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1417: Descriptive statistics of contin-
uous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2617: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2618: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2619: Distribution of Family Business 
conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1418: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when WOBOD = 1 
 
Graph 2620: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Table 1419: Descriptive statistics of contin-
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of the business, the number of companies that have at least one female director is always higher 










The same reasoning applies also to Graph 12, which considers the variables Women on Boards 
and Part of a group. Indeed, irrespective of the membership to a group or not, the number of 
companies that have at least one woman in the BoD is higher than the one that do not have 
female directors. Nevertheless, companies that are part of a group are more likely to have at 









Despite UK has greater gender equality than Italy – as proven by the higher Global Gender Gap 
Index – Graph 13 exhibits how companies that have at least one female director are more than 
companies that do not opt for women representation, in both countries. Moreover, the percent-
age of firms that have at least one woman in the BoD is more or less the same when dividing 






















0 = No women on BoD
1 = Yes women on BoD
Graph 11: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2802: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2803: Distribution of 
Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2804: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2805: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54Graph 2806: Distribution of Part of a 
group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2807: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to 
WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2808: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2809: Distribution of 
Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2810: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2811: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54Graph 2812: Distribution of Part of a 
group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2813: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54 
 
Table 1455: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0.Graph 2814: Distribution of Coun-
try conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54Graph 2815: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N 
= 51 
 
Graph 2816: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54Graph 2817: Distribution of Part of a 
group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2818: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to 
WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2819: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2820: Distribution of 
Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2821: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2822: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54Graph 2823: Distribution of Part of a 
group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2824: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to 
WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2825: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51Graph 2826: Distribution of 
Family Business conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2827: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2828: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54Graph 2829: Distribution of Part of a 
group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 























0 = No women on BoD
1 = Yes women on BoD
Graph 12: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2994: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54Graph 2995: Distribution of Part of a 
group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 2996: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54 
 
Table 1505: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0.Graph 2997: Distribution of Coun-
try conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54Graph 2998: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to WOBOD. N 
= 5  
 
Graph 2999: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54Graph 3000: Distribution of Part of a 
group conditioned to WOBOD. N = 51 
 
Graph 3001: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54 
 
Table 1506: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0.Graph 3002: Distribution of Coun-
try conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54 
 
Table 1507: Descriptive statistics of continuous varia l s h n CEO = 0. 
 
 
Table 1508: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1.Table 1509: Descriptive statistics 
of continuous variables when CEO = 0.Graph 3003: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 
54 









The same analyses over continuous and dichotomous variables have been performed also for 
the variable CEO gender, resulting in one group composed by those companies that have a man 
CEO (CEO = 0), and the other one by those firms that have a woman CEO (CEO = 1). Tables 
























0 = No women on BoD
1 = Yes women on BoD
Graph 13: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54 
 
Table 1625: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0.Graph 3116: Distribution of Coun-
try conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54 
 
Table 1626: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0. 
 
 
Table 1627: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1.Table 1628: Descriptive statistics 
of continuous variables when CEO = 0.Graph 3117: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 
54 
 
Table 1629: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0.Graph 3118: Distribution of Coun-
try conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54 
 
Table 1630: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0. 
 
 
Table 1631: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1.Table 1632: Descriptive statistics 
of continuous variables when CEO = 0. 
 
 
Table 1633: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1. 
 
 
Graph 3119: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Table 1634: Descriptive 
statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1.Table 1635: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables 
when CEO = 0. 
 
 
Table 1636: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1.Table 1637: Descriptive statistics 
of continuous variables when CEO = 0.Graph 3120: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 
54 
 
Table 1638: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0.Graph 3121: Distribution of Coun-
try conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54 
 
Table 1639: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0. 
 
 
Table 1640: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1.Table 1641: Descriptive statistics 
of continuous variables when CEO = 0.Graph 3122: Distribution of Country conditioned to WOBOD. N = 
54 
 
Table 1642: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0.Graph 3123: Distribution of Coun-
try conditioned to WOBOD. N = 54 
 
Table 1643: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0. 
 
 
Table 1644: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1.Table 1645: Descriptive statistics 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0. 
 
 
Table 1785: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1.Table 1786: Descriptive statistics of continuous 
variables when CEO = 0. 
 
 
Table 1787: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1. 
 
 
Graph 3198: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Table 1788: Descriptive statistics of con-
tinuous variables when CEO = 1.Table 1789: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 0. 
 
 
Table 1790: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1.Table 1791: Descriptive statistics of continuous 
variables when CEO = 0. 
 
 
Table 1792: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1. 
 
 
Graph 3199: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Table 1793: Descriptive statistics of con-
tinuous variables when CEO = 1. 
 
 
Graph 3200: Distribut on of F mily Business conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
Graph 3201: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Graph 3202: Distribution of Family Busi-
ness conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Table 1794: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1. 
Table 17: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1. 
 
 
Graph 3328: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Table 1897: Descriptive statistics of con-
tinuous variables when CEO = 1. 
 
Graph 3329: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
raph 3330: istribution of Part of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Graph 3331: istribution of Family Busi-
ness conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Table 1898: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables when CEO = 1. 
 
 
Graph 3332: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Table 1899: Descriptive statistics of con-
tinuous variables when CEO = 1. 
 
 
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES N = 41
Variable Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum # Observations
Overall BIS 91,341 11,466 80 123 41
Community CS 26,415 9,373 12 50 41
Workers CS 25,289 6,810 0 36 38
Enviroment CS 18,512 13,744 4 62 41
Total Assets 5.254.656 11.946.954 93.380 58.615.045 24
EBITDA 312.253 519.755 -592.266 1.677.436 24
ROE -0,19 47,50 -174,62 71,63 24
CEO = 0
CONTINUOUS VARIABLES N = 15
Variable Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum # Observations
Overall BIS 94,867 13,538 82 126 15
Community CS 32,800 16,357 10 83 15
Workers CS 30,100 14,325 21 69 10
Enviroment CS 15,333 12,448 5 49 15
Total Assets 689.464 970.281 21.829 2.594.826 6
EBITDA 60.213 130.748 -120.189 245.005 6
ROE 3,01 122,33 -207,470 89,900 5
CEO = 1
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Considering the continuous variables of the model, the differences in the means of the two 
groups are stronger when looking at the sustainability scores, especially for the Community and 
Workers scores, which are greater in firms with women CEOs compared to firms with men 
CEOs.  
Furthermore, companies with a woman CEO appear to have higher ROE (3,01 vs -0,19) but 
lower EBITDA (60.213 vs 312.253). In contrast to what identified before for the variable 
Women on Boards, considering the CEO gender, businesses with a woman CEO seem to be 
smaller than businesses with men CEOs. Nevertheless, also for this variable it is not possible 
to affirm aprioristically that the differences between the means are statistically significant: only 
the T-tests developed in Paragraph 4.3 will allow to make more accurate considerations. 
For the qualitative variables, Graph 14 considers the dichotomous variables CEO gender and 
Family Business, and it exhibits how the number of companies that have a man CEO is always 
higher compared to the one with a woman CEO, regardless of the kind of the business. How-











Also the membership or not to a Group of companies does not affect the gender of the CEO – 
as shown in Graph 15 – because in both groups men CEOs are more than women CEOs. Nev-
ertheless, it seems that it is more probable to have women CEOs when being in a group 
compared to not being in a group, because the 27% of companies that are part of a group have 
























0 = Man CEO
1 = Woman CEO
Graph 14: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
Graph 3528: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Graph 3529: Distribution of 
Family Business conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
Graph 3530: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
 
Graph 3531: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56Graph 3532: Distribution of Part 
of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Graph 3533: Distribution of Family Business conditioned to 
CEO gender. N = 50 
 
Graph 3534: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50Graph 3535: Distribution of 
Family Business conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
Graph 3536: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
 
Graph 3537: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56Graph 3538: Distribution of Part 
of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
 
Graph 3539: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56 
 
 
Table 1939: Results of the logistic models.Graph 3540: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. 
N = 56Graph 3541: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 










Contrarily to the variable Women on Boards, when considering the CEO gender there is a dif-
ference between Italy and UK. Graph 16 shows how, despite in both countries men CEOs are 
always more than women CEOs, it is more plausible to have a woman CEO in UK than in Italy: 












4.2. Step one: women representation and sustainability propensity 
The empirical analysis starts with the logistic models, employed to understand whether there 
are statistically significant differences between sustainable and non-sustainable companies on 
the basis of two proxies for female representation: Women on Boards and CEO gender. Thus, 























0 = Man CEO
1 = Woman CEO
Graph 15: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
 
Graph 3719: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56Graph 3720: Distribution of Part 
of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
 
Graph 3721: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56 
 
 
Table 1990: Results of the logistic models.Graph 3722: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. 
N = 56Graph 3723: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
 
Graph 3724: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56Graph 3725: Distribution of Part 
of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
 
Graph 3726: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56 
 
 
Table 1991: Results of the logistic models.Graph 3727: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. 
N = 56 
 
 
Table 1992: Results of the logistic models. 
 
Table 1993: The correlation matrix for the logistic models.Table 1994: Results of the logistic models.Graph 
3728: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56 
 
 
Table 1995: Results of the logistic models.Graph 3729: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. 
N = 56Graph 3730: Distribution of Part of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
 
Graph 3731: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56Graph 3732: Distribution of Part 
of a group conditioned to CEO gender. N = 50 
 
 
Graph 3733: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56 
 
 
Table 1996: Results of the logistic models.Graph 3734: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. 

























0 = Man CEO
1 = Woman CEO
Graph 16: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56 
 
 
Table 2075: Results of the logistic models.Graph 3822: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. 
N = 56 
 
 
Table 2076: Results of the logistic models. 
 
Table 2077: The correlation matrix for the logistic models.Table 2078: Results of the logistic models.Graph 
3823: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. N = 56 
 
 
Table 2079: Results of the logistic models.Graph 3824: Distribution of Country conditioned to CEO gender. 
N = 56 
 
 
Table 2080: Results of the logistic odels. 
 
Table 2081: The correlation matrix for the logistic models.Table 2082: Results of the logistic models. 
 
Table 2083: The correlation matrix for the logistic models. 
 
Table 2084: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models.Table 2085: The correlation matrix for the lo-
gistic models.Table 2086: Results of the logistic models. 
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having a woman as a CEO influence the sustainability propensity of firms, thus if female rep-
resentation leads firms to be sustainable.  












Looking to the estimates of the parameters, it can be noted how for the variable Women on 
Boards its estimates are statistically significant considering a 1% significance level in both 
models. This means that the probability of being a sustainable firm (Sustainability = 1) is greater 
when in the Board of the company there is at least one female director (WOBOD = 1). More 
precisely, the probability of a company that has at least one female director to obtain the B Corp 
Certification is 5,21 times (e1,651) higher than firms with no women directors. When considering 
also the structural characteristics of the enterprise, such parameter is still significant, and it 
equals to 4,40 times (e1,418). Quite the contrary, looking to the variable CEO gender, its param-
eters are not statistically significant in neither model: having a woman CEO does not increase 
the probability of a firm to be sustainable.  
It seems that, on the basis of these first general analysis, having at least one woman in the Board 
of Directors influences the sustainability propensity of companies, inducing them to be sustain-
able, and thus confirming H1. Quite the contrary, there is no support about H3: having a woman 
CEO does not drive firms to operate sustainably.  
 
7 Results refer to empirical models in which the continuous variables have been winsorized at the 95th percentile in order 
to limit the influence of outliers, and that have been standardized in order to make comparable their distributions. 
Table 18: Results of the logistic models. 
 
Table 2094: The correlation matrix for the logistic models.Table 2095: Results of the logistic models. 
 
Table 2096: The correlation matrix for the logistic models. 
 
Table 2097: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models.Table 2098: The correlation matrix for the logistic models.Ta-
ble 2099: Results of the logistic models. 
 
Table 2100: The correlation matrix for the logistic models.Table 2101: Results of the logistic models. 
 
Table 2102: The correlation matrix for the logistic models. 
 
Table 2103: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models.Table 2104: The correlation matrix for the logistic models. 
 
Table 2105: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models. 
 
Table 2106: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2107: Comparison of logit and probit logistic mod-
els.Table 2108: The correlation matrix for the logistic models. 
 
Table 2109: Co parison of logit and probit logistic models.Table 2110: The correlation matrix for the logistic models.Ta-
ble 2111: Results of the logistic models. 
 
Table 2112: The correlation matrix for the logistic models.Tabl  2113: Results of he logistic models. 
 
Table 2114: The correlation matrix for the logistic models. 
 
Table 2115: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models.Table 2116: The correlation matrix for the logistic models.Ta-
ble 2117: Results of the logistic models. 
 
Table 2118: The correlation matrix for the logistic models.Table 2119: Results of the logistic models. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Sustainability Sustainability Sustainability Sustainability
WOBOD 1,651*** 1,418*** CEO gender -0,202 -0,461
(0,210) (0,407) (0,425) (0,522)
Total Asset 0,178 Total Asset 0,180
(0,281) (0,277)
EBITDA -0,737 EBITDA -0,782
(1,428) (1,401)
ROE 0,048 ROE -0,027
(0,231) (0,245)
Intercept 0,878*** -2,575*** Intercept 1,770*** -1,7288***
(0,377) (0,356) (0,382) (0,236)
Pseudo R² 0,095 0,235 Pseudo R² 0,001 0,181
Observations 258 227 Observations 258 227
Variable Variable
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
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4.2.1. Robustness analysis  
To understand whether the logistic models are correctly specified, first of all a correlation ma-
trix has been drafted, and secondly the logit model – employed for the first-step analysis – has 
been compared with the probit one, to verify whether results are the same when comparing the 
two methodologies.  
The correlation matrix has the main aim of describing how the continuous variables are related 
to each other, and it helps to identify the presence of multicollinearity problems, which arise 
when one variable of the model is linearly predicted by others with a substantial degree of 
accuracy. If multicollinearity is present in the model, it involves distorted estimates of the pa-
rameters, thus leading to incorrect evaluations of the results obtained. Note that the correlation 
matrix includes only the continuous variables Total Assets, EBITDA and ROE, while the vari-
ables Women on Boards and CEO gender are excluded as they are dichotomous ones.  
The results of the correlation matrix are shown in Table 19: they suggest that a correlation is in 








When the response variable is dichotomous, the choice about the logistic model to apply can 
range between the logit and the probit models. Despite both of them take the linear model and 
transform it into a non-linear relationship, they differ in how they define the function f ( ): while 
the logit model employs the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution, the 
probit uses the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.  
Nevertheless, both methods drive to similar inferences, and here are presented the results of 
both models in order to verify whether such assertion is true or not, thus to understand if em-
ploying the probit model instead of the logit one drives to different outcomes.  
Table 20 compares the logit and the probit logistic models, showing how, regardless of the 
methods employed, the significance of the variables does not change.   
Table 19: The correlation matrix for the logistic models. 
 
Table 2120: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models.Table 2121: The 
correlation matrix for the logistic models. 
 
Table 2122: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models. 
 
Table 2123: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2124: 
Comparison of logit and probit logistic models.Table 2125: The correlation 
matrix for the logistic models. 
 
Table 2126: Compa ison of logit and probit logistic models.Table 2127: T e 
correlation matrix for the logistic models. 
 
Table 2128: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models. 
 
Table 2129: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2130: 
Comparison of logit a d probit logistic models. 
 
Table 2131: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
Tabl  2132: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2133: Sample 
size for T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2134: Comparison of logit and 
probit log stic models. 
 
Table 2135: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2136: 
Comparison of logit and probit logistic models.Table 2137: The correlation 
matrix for the logistic models. 
 
Table 2138: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models.Table 2139: The 
Total Assets EBITDA ROE
Total Assets 1,000
EBITDA 0,592*** 1,000
ROE -0,067 0,199 1,000
The correlation matrix includes quantitative variables only.                                                                                                              
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Thus, regardless of the methodology employed for the logistic models, the presence of women 
in corporate Boards influence positively the sustainability propensity of firms, while the pres-
ence of a female CEO does not have any effect over such matter.  
Nevertheless, such first-step analysis depicts only if women representation drives companies to 
be sustainable, but does not explain anything about the level of sustainability pursued. To dig 
deeper into the issue, the second-step analysis permits to understand whether women represen-
tation drives companies to operate more sustainably compared to companies that do not have 
female directors or female CEOs. 
 
4.3. Step two: women representation and sustainability intensity 
The second-step analysis focuses on understanding the effects that having a woman in the BoD 
or a woman as a CEO has on the level of sustainability pursued by sustainable firms. Indeed, 
despite the presence of women in corporate Boards induce companies to behave sustainably – 
as shown in paragraph 4.2. – this does not imply that women representation has the same impact 
also on the sustainability intensity of firms.  
To answer to such question, firstly are shown the results of the T-tests, and secondly the out-
comes of the regression models. As previously stated, the sustainability level of firms is 
measured by the four B Impact Scores, namely the Overall B Impact Score, the Community 
Company Score, the Workers Company Score and the Environment Company Score, which are 
employed as proxies for different layers of sustainability. 
 
Table 20: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models. 
 
Table 2146: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2147: Comparison of logit and pro-
bit logistic models. 
 
Table 2148: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
Table 2149: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2150: Sample size for T-tests over 
Women on Boards.Table 2151: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models. 
 
Table 2152: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2153: Comparison of logit and pro-
bit logistic models. 
 
Table 2154: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
Table 2155: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2156: Sample size for T-tests over 
Women on Boards. 
 
Table 2157: Results for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
 
Table 2158: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2159: Results of T-tests over Women on 
Boards.Table 2160: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
Table 2161: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2162: Sample size for T-tests over 
Women on Boards.Table 2163: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models. 
 
Table 2164: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2165: Comparison of logit and pro-
bit logistic models. 
 
Table 2166: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
Table 2167: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2168: Sample size for T-tests over 
Women on Boards.Table 2169: Comparison of logit and probit logistic models. 
 
Table 2170: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2171: Comparison of logit and pro-
bit logistic models. 
Model 1 - Logit Model 1 - Probit Model 2 - Logit Model 2 - Probit Model 1 - Logit Model 1 - Probit Model 2 - Logit Model 2 - Probit
Sustainability Sustainability Sustainability Sustainability Sustainability Sustainability Sustainability Sustainability
WOBOD 1,651*** 0,905*** 1,418*** 0,771*** CEO gender -0,202 -0,112 -0,461 -0,240
(0,210) (0,199) (0,407) (0,215) (0,425) (0,233) (0,522) (0,274)
Total Asset 0,178 0,103 Total Asset 0,180 0,096
(0,281) (0,154) (0,277) (0,151)
EBITDA -0,737 -0,468 EBITDA -0,782 -0,423
(1,428) (0,788) (1,401) (0,763)
ROE 0,048 0,021 ROE -0,027 -0,010
(0,231) (0,130) (0,245) (0,132)
Intercept 0,878*** -1,448*** -2,575*** -1,480*** Intercept 1,770*** -0,945*** -1,728*** -1,033***
(0,377) (0,153) (0,356) (0,178) (0,382) (0,104) (0,236) (0,128)
Pseudo R² 0,095 0,095 0,235 0,236 Pseudo R² 0,001 0,001 0,181 0,181
Observations 258 258 227 227 Observations 258 258 227 227
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Variable Variable
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4.3.1. The T-tests 
The T-tests executed in such paragraph have the main aim of evaluating the variations of the 
Overall B Impact Score, the Community Company Score, the Workers Company Score and the 
Environment Company Score dividing the observations for the presence or absence of women 
in the Board of Directors in first place, and then repeating the same analyses separating the 
sample for the gender of the CEO.  
For the dichotomous variable Women on Boards, the sample size on the basis of the four sus-







Looking to the P-values of these T-tests it is possible to affirm that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the means of the two samples with a 90% confidence level: it is 
not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the averages of the two samples are equal to each 
other. It seems that, limited to such first intuitive analysis, there is no connection between the 
presence or absence of a woman in the Board of Directors and the sustainability intensity of 
firms.  
Moving to the other proxy of female representation, for the dichotomous variable CEO gender 
the sample size is described by Table 23 and results are summarized in Table 24.  
 
Table 21: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
Table 2172: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2173: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
Table 2174: Results for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
 
Table 2175: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2176: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2177: 
Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
Table 2178: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2179: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
Table 2180: Results for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
 
Table 2181: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2182: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
 
Table 2183: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
 
Table 2184: Results of T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2185: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2186: Results 
for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
 
Table 2187: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2188: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2189: 
Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
Table 2190: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2191: Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
Table 2192: Results for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
 
Table 2193: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2194: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards.Table 2195: 
Sample size for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
Table 22: Results for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
 
Table 2198: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2199: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
 
Table 2200: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
 
Table 2201: Results of T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2202: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2203: Results 
for T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
 
Table 2204: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2205: Results of T-tests over Women on Boards. 
 
 
Table 2206: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
 
Table 2207: Results of T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2208: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
 
Table 2209: Results for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2210: Results of T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2211: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Variable # Observ. WOBOD = 0 # Observ. WOBOD = 1 Total # Observations
Overall BIS 14 40 54
Community CS 14 40 54
Workers CS 13 33 46
Enviroment CS 14 40 54
Variable Mean WOBOD = 0 Mean WOBOD = 1 Mean difference T-test  P-value
Overall BIS 94,714 91,475 3,239 0,864 0,392
Community CS 25,500 29,675 -4,175 -1,030 0,308
Workers CS 26,385 26,091 0,294 0,098 0,922
Enviroment CS 17,071 17,900 -0,829 -0,194 0,847






Looking to the P-values of these T-tests it is possible to see that only for one score – the Com-
munity Company Score – there is statistically significant difference between the two groups. 
Thus, considering a 90% confidence level, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that the 
means of the two samples are equal.  
Nonetheless, for the other three tests, there is no statistically significant difference between the 
means of the two samples, as shown by the P-values.  
Therefore, limited to such first analysis, it appears that having a woman as a Chief Executive 
Officer has a significant influence over the Community Company Score, thus over the social 
sustainability. This validates the hypothesis that the relation between women representation and 
sustainability is stronger on the social rather than on the environmental side – H2 – since the 
gender of the CEO has positive effects over the proxy for social sustainability, but no effects 
over the proxy for environmental sustainability. Moreover, the tests confirm likewise the hy-
pothesis for which the relation between women and sustainability is stronger when the woman 
is also CEO – H3 – given that the positive effect over social sustainability is recorded when the 
CEO is a woman. Quite the contrary, there is no evidence that support H1: limited to such T-
tests, having a female director does not lead companies to operate more sustainably compared 
to firms that do not opt for female representation. 
 
Table 23: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
 
Table 2223: Results of T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2224: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2225: Results for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2226: Results of T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2227: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
 
Table 2228: Results of T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2229: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
 
Table 2230: Results for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2231: Results of T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2232: Results for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2233: Results of T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2234: S mple size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
 
Table 2235: Results of T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2236: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
 
Table 2237: Results for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2238: Results of T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2239: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
 
Table 2240: Results of T-tests over CEO gender.Table 2241: Sample size for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 24: Results for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2242: Results of T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2243: Results for T-tests over CEO gender. 
Table 2244: Results of T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2245: Result  for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2246: Results of T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2247: Results for T-tests over CEO gender. 
 
Table 2248: Results of T-tests over CEO gender. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 2249: Results for Overall and Community scores employing WOBOD.***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 2250: Results for Overall and Community scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2251: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing 
WOBOD.Table 2252: Results for Overall and Community scores employing 
WOBOD.***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 2253: Results for Overall and Community scores employing WOBOD.***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 2254: Results for Overall and Community scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2255: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD.Table 2256: Results for 
Overall and Community scor s employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2257: R ults fo  Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2258: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender.Table 2259: Results for 
Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD.Table 2260: Results for Overall and Community 
scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2261: Results for Workers and Environment scores mploying 
WOBOD.Table 2262: Results for Overall and Community scores employing 
WOBOD.***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 2263: Results for Overall and Community scores employing WOBOD.***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 2264: Results for Overall and Community scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2265: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing 
WOBOD.Table 2266: Results for Overall and Community scores employing 
WOBOD.***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 2267: Results for Overall and Community scores employing WOBOD.***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable # Observ. CEO = 0 # Observ. CEO = 1 Total # Observations
Overall BIS 41 15 56
Community CS 41 15 56
Workers CS 38 10 48
Enviroment CS 41 15 56
Variable Mean CEO = 0 Mean CEO = 1 Mean difference T-test  P-value
Overall BIS 91,341 94,867 -3,525 -0,970 0,336
Community CS 26,415 32,800 -6,385 -1,824 0,074*
Workers CS 25,289 30,100 -4,811 -1,538 0,131
Enviroment CS 18,512 15,333 3,179 0,785 0,436
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4.3.2. The multiple linear regression models 
The multiple regression models applied in such paragraph aim to identify the relation which 
lies between women representation and the sustainability intensity of firms, relating the B Im-
pact Scores with the two proxies for female representation. While at first the sustainability 
scores are related only to the two independent variables, the following models include also 
some control variables, namely the structural characteristics of the enterprise and then the or-
ganizational slack. 
Models 3 include only the independent variables Women on Boards and CEO gender, Models 
4 add to the previous one the structural characteristics of the enterprise (namely the familiar 
type, the group membership and the country of origin), and lastly Models 5 comprise the or-
ganizational slack, thus the size and performance of firms.   





8 The variable country has not been included in Models 5 because, as explained in the methodological section, financial 
information were available just for Italian firms. 
Table 25: Results for Overall and Community scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2268: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD.Table 2269: Results for Overall and Com-
munity scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2270: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2271: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender.Table 2272: Results for Workers and 
Environment scores employing WOBOD.Table 2273: Results for Overall and Community scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2274: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD.Table 2275: Results for Overall and Com-
munity scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2276: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2277: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender.Table 2278: Results for Workers and 
Environment scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2279: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2280: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender.Table 2281: Results of Workers and Envi-
ronment scores employing CEO gender.Table 2282: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2283: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender.Table 2284: Results for Workers and 
Environment scores employing WOBOD.Table 2285: Results for Overall and Community scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2286: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD.Table 2287: Results for Overall and Com-
mu ity scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2288: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2289: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender.Table 2290: Results for Workers and 
Environment scores employing WOBOD.Table 2291: Results for Overall and Community scores employing WOBOD. 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Overall BIS Overall BIS Overall BIS Community CS Community CS Community CS
WOBOD  -3,570 -5,844 -5,782 WOBOD 4,175 3,271 -0,965
(3,835) (3,827) (5,523) (3,982) (4,189) (2,658)
Family -0,167 -0,542 Family 2,975 -0,419
(3,959) (6,436) (4,306) (3,104)
Group   9,253** 8,066 Group 3,555 9,530**
(4,099) (8,673) (4,506) (4,166)
Country  4,342 Country 3,248
(3,462) (3,788)
Total Assets 1,960 Total Assets -7,784*
(8,654) (4,194)
EBITDA -2520 EBITDA -1,245
(4,759) (2,272)
ROE -3,540 ROE 0,469
(3,701) (1,778)
Intercept  94,714*** 92,527*** 94,221*** Intercept 25,500*** 23,661*** 23,084***
(3,293) (3,438) (5,224) (3,428) (3,779) (2,532)
Observations 54 51 29 Observations 54 51 29
Pseudo R² 0,020 0,157 0,150 Pseudo R² 0,017 0,036 0,339
Variable Variable
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
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Observing the estimates of the parameters, it is possible to affirm that there is no statistically 
significant connection between the variable Women on Boards and the four B Impact Scores: 
it seems that having a female director does not influence the level of sustainability pursued by 
companies. Thus, despite having a woman in Corporate Boards increases the sustainability pro-
pensity, intended as the willingness of companies to engage in sustainable practices, on the 
other side it does not impact the sustainability intensity. This means that women directors drive 
firms to behave ethically, but do not induce corporations to behave more ethically compared to 
other sustainable firms.  







Table 26: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2294: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender.Table 2295: Results for Workers and En-
vironment scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2296: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2297: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender.Table 2298: Results of Workers and Envi-
ronment scores employing CEO gender.Table 2299: Results for Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2300: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender.Table 2301: Results for Workers and En-
vironment scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2302: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2303: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender.Table 2304: Results of Workers and Envi-
ronment scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2305: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2306: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables.Table 2307: Results for Overall and Community scores em-
ploying CEO gender.Table 2308: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2309: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender.Table 2310: Results of Workers and Envi-
ronment scores employing CEO gend r.T ble 2311: Results for Workers and Environment scor s employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2312: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender.Table 2313: Results for Workers and En-
vironment scores employing WOBOD. 
 
Table 2314: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2315: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender.Table 2316: Results of Workers and Envi-
ronment scores employ ng CEO gender.Table 2317: Results f r Workers and Environment scores employing WOBOD.
 
Table 2318: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender.Table 2319: Results for Workers and En-
vironment scores employing WOBOD. 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Workers CS Workers CS Workers CS Environment CS Environment CS Environment CS
WOBOD -0,375 -1,290 0,543 WOBOD 0,829 -0,455 1,422
(2,981) (3,148) (2,172) (4,228) (4,000) (4,733)
Family -0,772 0,961 Family 11,186*** 4,382
(3,323) (2,501) (4,091) (5,509)
Group 5,014 -1,766 Group -2,610 -1,508
(3,399) (3,357) (4,311) (7,404)
Country 2,051 Country -7,801**
(2,968) (3,634)
Total Assets -4,201 Total Assets 23,029***
(3,382) (7,457)
EBITDA 1,789 EBITDA -5,495
(1,837) (4,067)
ROE 1,214 ROE -7,218**
(1,448) (3,177)
Intercept 26,385*** 25,487*** 24,546*** Intercept 17,072*** 18,446*** 23,462***
(2,524) (2,759) (2,041) (3,641) (3,601) (4,503)
Observations 46 43 28 Observations 54 51 29
Pseudo R² 0,005 0,019 0,115 Pseudo R² 0,005 0,223 0,498
Variable Variables
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
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Table 27: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2346: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables.Table 2347: Results for Overall and Community scores em-
ploying CEO gender. 
 
Table 2348: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables. 
 
Table 2349: The test RESET for the linear models employed.Table 2350: Correlation matrix for the continuous varia-
bles.Table 2351: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2352: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables.Table 2353: Results for Overall and Community scores em-
ploying CEO gender. 
 
Table 2354: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables. 
 
Table 2355: The test RESET for the linear models employed.Table 2356: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables. 
 
Table 2357: The test RESET for the linear models employed. 
 
Table 2358: Main results.Table 2359: The test RESET for the linear models employed.Table 2360: Correlation matrix for 
the continuous variables. 
 
Table 2361: The test RESET for the linear models employed.Table 2362: Correlation matrix for the continuous varia-
bles.Table 2363: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2364: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables.Table 2365: Results for Overall and Community scores em-
ploying CEO gender. 
 
Table 2366: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables. 
 
Table 2367: The test RESET for the linear models employed.Table 2368: Correlation matrix for the continuous varia-
bles.Table 2369: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2370: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables.Table 2371: Results for Overall and Community scores em-
ploying CEO gender. 
Table 28: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2320: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender.Table 2321: Results of Workers and Envi-
ronment scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2322: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2323: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables.Table 2324: Results for Overall and Community scores em-
ploying CEO gender.Table 2325: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2326: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender.Table 2327: Results of Workers and Envi-
ronment scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2328: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2329: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables.Table 2330: Results for Overall and Community scores em-
ploying CEO gender. 
 
Table 2331: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables. 
 
Table 2332: The test RESET for the linear models employed.Table 2333: Correlation matrix for the continuous varia-
bles.Table 2334: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2335: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables.Table 2336: Results for Overall and Community scores em-
ploying CEO gender.Table 2337: Results of Workers and Environment scores employing CEO gender. 
 
Table 2338: Results for Overall and Community scores employing CEO gender.Table 2339: Results of Workers and Envi-
ronment scores employing CEO gender. 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Overall BIS Overall BIS Overall BIS Community CS Community CS Community CS
CEO gender 4,021 2,954 4,702 CEO gender 6,385* 7,296** -0,487
(3,768) (4,057) (6,772) (3,437) (3,667) (3,243)
Family -1,269 -1,311 Family  3,698 -0,335
(4,078) (6,630) (3,661) (3,156)
Group 7,837* 4,828 Group 5,137 9,399**
(4,121) (8,820) (3,746) (4,227)
Country 4,217 Country 4,220
(3,585) (3,238)
Total Assets 2,843 Total Assets -7,816*
(8,816) (4,227)
EBITDA -1,761 EBITDA -1,379
(4,973) (2,369)
ROE -3,964 ROE 0,585
(3,837) (1,839)
Intercept 90,846*** 88,170*** 90,215*** Intercept 26,415*** 22,512*** 22,468***
(1,965) (2,648) (3,844) (1,780) (2,372) (1,835)
Observations 56 50 29 Observations 56 50 29
Pseudo R² 0,014 0,116 0,101 Pseudo R² 0,043 0,101 0,338
Variable Variable
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Workers CS Workers CS Workers CS Environment CS Environment CS Environment CS
CEO gender 4,878 7,195** 2,566 CEO gender -3,179 -6.000 -0,693
(3,127) (3,633) (2,797) (4,017) (4,061) (5,799)
Family -1,349 0,517 Family 11,520*** 4,491
(3,159) (2,514) (4,008) (5,597)
Group 4,276 -2,417 Group -2,815 -0,865
(3,159) (3,369) (4,132) (7,512)
Country 1,443 Country -7,844***
(2,856) (3,576)
Total Assets -3,907 Total Assets 22,874***
(3,352) (7,511)
EBITDA 2,282 EBITDA -5,585
(1,880) (4,233)
ROE 0,879 ROE -7,184**
(1,459) (3,279)
Intercept  25,222*** 23,922*** 24,846*** Intercept 18,512*** 19,798*** 24,432***
(1,425) (1.999) (1,460) (2,073) (2,598) (3,255)
Observations 48 43 28 Observations 56 50 29
Pseudo R² 0,005 0,034 0,131 Pseudo R² 0,014 0,273 0,439
Variable Variables
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
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Looking to the estimates of the parameters, it is possible to observe how there is no statistically 
significant difference between the variable CEO gender and the Overall B Impact Score. Ac-
cording to the results of the analysis over Women on Boards, women representation does not 
impact the general level of sustainability pursued by companies. Indeed, regardless of the proxy 
employed to measure women representation, both Women on Boards and CEO gender do not 
influence the Overall B Impact Score. This implies that there is no evidence to confirm the 
intensity side of H1: having a woman in corporate Boards or a woman as a CEO does not drive 
firms to behave more ethically compared to other sustainable firms.  
Nevertheless, H3 is partially confirmed: when a woman is not simply a member of the Board, 
but she is the CEO of the company, there are positive effects over the level of sustainability 
pursued by firms. Indeed, while the variable Women on Boards does not impact any of the B 
Impact Scores, the variable CEO gender has positive effects over the proxies for social sustain-
ability, namely the Community and Workers Company Scores. As a matter of fact, when the 
CEO of the company is a woman, such two B Impact Scores are roughly 6-7 points higher 
compared to firms in which the CEO is a man. Therefore, despite female CEOs do not influence 
the sustainability propensity of firms – as shown in the previous paragraphs – they impact the 
sustainability intensity of firms, thus the level of ethicality they pursue.  
Such discovery influences also another hypothesis of the research – H2 – which assumes that 
the relation between women representation and sustainability is stronger on the social rather on 
the environmental side. This is confirmed by the results here obtained: having a woman CEO 
influences the social intensity of sustainability, while no effects are shown on the environmental 
side of sustainability, as proven by the no-significance of the parameters in the Environment 
Company Score. Unfortunately, results about H2 are tied only to the intensity part, as it was not 
possible to measure the sustainability propensity on the social and on the environmental side.   
Despite the focus of the dissertation is about understanding the connection between women 
representation and sustainability, alongside the results obtained for the variables Women on 
Boards and CEO gender, other outcomes analogue to both variables can be helpful to under-
stand more the framework in which sustainability operates.  
Firstly, being part of a group of companies positively influence both the general and the social 
levels of sustainability pursued by companies: firms that are part of a corporate group are more 
sustainable compared to companies that are not part of a group. 
Moreover, firm’s size, represented by the variable Total Assets, negatively influence the social 
sustainability of firms, while positively impacts the environmental side. Large companies are 
thus more inclined toward the environmental matters, and less concerned about the social ones. 
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This is because larger firms are usually associated with greater environmental proactiveness 
compared to smaller firms: large size increases firm visibility, capturing greater pressures to 
adhere to appropriate levels of environmental performance (Etzion 2007). At the same time, 
several studies have highlighted how large firms are associated to greater resource slack, im-
plying that big companies do not have only greater visibility, but also more resources to devote 
to environmental issues (Bowen 2000). This confirms also the negative relation between size 
and social sustainability, as given the greater resource slack that large firms possess, they can 
afford to allocate such resources toward resisting stakeholders’ pressures and concerns. Quite 
the contrary, small firms are more likely to be responsive to stakeholders’ pressures (Besser 
1999), and they tend to be an embedded part of the local community especially when their 
success is tied to the degree of legitimacy they get from local stakeholders (Perrini 2006). 
Results sustain also the positive relation which lies between the familiar type and environmental 
sustainability: family businesses present higher Environment Company Score compared to 
firms that are not family businesses. As a matter of fact, the governance characteristics of family 
businesses create an excellent starting point for the pursuing of ecologically sustainable poli-
cies, thus making family businesses more inclined toward sustainability (Wells 2013).  
Lastly, according to the study of Rosati and Faria (2019), the Return on Equity was found to 
have a negative relationship with the environmental sustainability of firms. Nevertheless, the 
literature over such matter offers mixed evidence, because other researches, like the study of 
Setó‐Pamies (2015), highlights how such index positively influence the sustainability side of 
firms.  
 
4.3.3. Robustness analysis 
To understand whether the linear models are correctly represented and specified, some analyses 
have been performed, starting from the correlation matrix, and ending with the test for misspec-
ification. The correlation matrix includes only continuous variables, and are included both 
dependent and control variables. Note that Women on Boards, CEO gender, Family Business, 
Part of a group and Country are excluded from the matrix as they are dichotomous variables.  
The results9 of the correlation matrix are shown in Table 29. 
 
9 Results refer to empirical models in which the continuous variables have been winsorized and standardized. 
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The correlation matrix shows how the majority of the four B Impact Scores of B Lab are sig-
nificantly correlated one to the other, but correlations emerge also with some of the economic-
financial indicators. The most intense correlation is the one characterizing the environmental 
score and the ROE of a company. However, such correlations are not intense enough to be 
possibly impacting on the reliability of the analysis provided in the previous paragraphs.  
To test the misspecification of the linear models, the test RESET has been employed. Such test 
helps to understand whether non-linear combinations of the parameters help to explain the de-
pendent variable. If non-linear combinations have any ability in explaining the dependent 
variable, the model suffers from misspecification, thus the model may be better estimated by a 
polynomial or other non-linear functional form. This can be understood from the P-value of the 
test: if the P-value is below the α level decided, the null-hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference among the models is rejected. The model therefore suffers from misspecification. 
From Table 30 it is possible to notice that for all the four dependent variables and for both the 
proxies for female representation, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected: all the models do not 








Table 29: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables. 
 
Table 2372: The test RESET for the linear models employed.Table 2373: Correlation matrix for the continuous variables. 
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Table 30: The test RESET for the linear models employed. 
 
Table 2397: Main results.Table 2398: The test RESET for the linear 
models employed. 
 
Table 2399: Main results. 
 
Table 2400: Main results.Table 2401: The test RESET for the linear 
models employed. 
 
Table 2402: Main results.Table 2403: The test RESET for the linear 
models employed. 
 
Table 2404: Main results. 
 
Overall BIS Community CS Workers CS Enviroment CS Total Assets EBITDA ROE
Overall BIS 1,000
Community CS 0,257* 1,000
Workers CS 0,315** -0,255* 1,000
Enviroment CS 0,195 -0,175 -0,251* 1,000
Total Assets -0,106 -0,231 0,029 0,183 1,000
EBITDA -0,123 -0,028 0,110 -0,140 0,357* 1,000
ROE -0,366* -0,114 0,175 -0,490*** -0,012 0,269 1,000
The correlation matrix includes quantitative variables only.                                                                                                              
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Model tested P-value
Overall BIS = WOBOD + Controls 0,9677
Community CS = WOBOD + Controls 0,2526
Workers CS = WOBOD + Controls 0,6106
Enviroment CS = WOBOD + Controls 0,1173
Overall BIS = CEO + Controls 0,2746
Community CS = CEO + Controls 0,1606
Workers CS = CEO + Controls 0,5721
Enviroment CS = CEO + Controls 0,1140
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1. Main results and implications 
Corporate Sustainability as well as women representation have become crucial phenomena for 
nowadays companies. On one side, the consequences of sustainability have been widely dis-
cussed in the literature starting from the second half of the last century, bringing to mix results 
both from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view. On the other side, the gender matter 
is a more recent focal point, whose corporate studies concentrate mainly on understanding 
whether women representation brings benefits to the organization.  
The literature underlines how one of the beneficial effects that women representation has on 
companies is about the greater attention female have toward sustainable matters, given that it 
is proven how women’s values, skills and experiences drive firms to provide additional atten-
tion to stakeholders’ pressures and claims. Despite the greatest part of empirical researches 
demonstrated a positive association between women and sustainability, other studies resulted 
in a mix evidence: some analyses exhibited a null connection between the two phenomena, 
especially on the environmental side of sustainability.  
Considering the doubtful scenario over this relationship, such dissertation aims to ascertain or 
refute the beliefs already popular in literature about the link which lies between women and 
sustainability. The uncertain literature over of such topic is the reason why this study has been 
drafted to test the truthfulness of the positive liaison between female representation and ethical 
policies, emphasizing the most ambiguous outcomes discussed by scholars. The research ques-
tions have been drafted with the purpose of providing a general viewpoint over the matter, then 
trying to develop ad hoc answers for the most uncertain results. 
Moreover, differently from other researches, such dissertation is not tied to one single dimen-
sion of sustainability, quite the contrary it deepens previous analysis enlarging the span of 
action both to the willingness or not of companies to engage in sustainability, and to the level 
of responsibility they decide to pursue, called respectively sustainability propensity and sus-
tainability intensity. The latter has been sub-divided into three sides of sustainability, namely 
the general level of sustainability, the social level of sustainability and the environmental level 
of sustainability. 
The study has been segmented into three research questions, further broken down for sustaina-
bility propensity and intensity, allowing for a better understanding of the effect that women 
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have on the tendency of companies to be sustainable, and on the level of sustainability they 
pursue. Hypothesis 1 is the most general question, which aims to test if women representation 
on the Boards of Directors is positively related to Corporate Sustainability. Hypothesis 2 tests 
if the relationship between women representation and Corporate Sustainability is stronger on 
the social rather than on the environmental side. Lastly, considering the emerging role of the 
Chief Executive Officer, and the impacts that his or her values have on corporate strategy, Hy-
pothesis 3 expects that firms with women CEOs are more inclined toward Corporate 
Sustainability.  
In the study, the B Corp Certification and the Benefit legal form have been defined as the basis 
for identifying sustainable companies. In particular, it has been theorized that companies with 
women in the BoD or with female CEOs are more likely to obtain the B Corp Certification – to 
test the sustainability propensity – and that are more likely to get higher scores in such Certifi-
cation – to test the sustainability intensity.   
To ease the interpretation, Table 31 summarizes the results obtained from the analyses per-
formed in Chapter 4, linking the outcomes in a matrix that considers both the research questions 









The starting point was the probability for a company to get the Certification in the presence of 
female directors and/or female CEOs, thus the sustainability propensity. Results were not uni-
vocal: while the positive relation between women on Boards and sustainability was confirmed, 
the models including the gender of the CEO have not allowed to validate Hypothesis 3. Such 
outcome may be linked to the narrow diversity when considering the CEO gender, as only the 
21% of the sample opted for a female executive officer. Nonetheless, such result is in line with 
worldwide trends, in which women CEOs are exceptions rather than the rule (Egan 2015). Quite 
the contrary, considering the more general proxy for female representation, thus the presence 
Table 31: Main results. 
 
Table 2416: Main results. 
 
Table 2417: Main results. 
 
Table 2418: Main results. 
 
Table 2419: Main results. 
 
Table 2420: Main results. 
 
Table 2421: Main results. 
 
Table 2422: Main results. 
Analyzed relation Sustainability Propensity
Sustainability 
Intensity
H1 Women representation and sustainability Confirmed Not Confirmed
H2 Women representation and social vs environmental sustainability - Confirmed
H3 Female CEO and sustainability Not confirmed Confirmed 
 - 77 - 
of women into corporate Boards, results are aligned with the literature: the probability of a 
corporation that has at least one woman director to get the B Corp Certification is roughly 5 
times higher than companies with no female directors. This robust result is also due to the ap-
propriate choice about the Certification because, according to Chen and Roberts (2013), are 
exactly the innovative features of B Corps to lead scholars to expect that having women in top 
positions contribute positively to sustainable outcomes. Indeed, this positive effect suggest that, 
even if costly, the opportunity for a woman to certify the company in which she operates as a 
B Corp is priceless, because they may have no other means to socially validate their beliefs and 
values (Moroz et al. 2018). 
The most relevant theoretical concept that supports the positive link between women and sus-
tainability is the greatest stakeholder’s orientation typical of women directors. The prominent 
stakeholder orientation is on one side a consequence of women’s values and skills, more in-
clined toward the care of others (Eagly & Johannesen‐Schmidt 2001), and on the other side it 
is the outcome of their propensity to treat equally interested parties, without giving primacy to 
investors (Adams & Funk 2012). Moreover, women directors are more collaborative, coopera-
tive and more friendly, being at the same time willing to help customers and subordinates to 
satisfy their needs and to accomplish their goals (Van Engen & Willemsen 2004).  
Intensifying the analysis, the deepening that has been performed connect women not anymore 
to the probability of getting the Certification, but to the scores obtained by companies when 
they certify. Thus, it focuses only on B Corps, trying to understand whether women represen-
tation has positive effects over the ratings obtained. This stringent analysis is justified by the 
study of Fernandez‐Feijoo, Romero & Ruiz‐Blanco (2014), who found out how companies with 
women directors present higher and more transparent levels of Corporate Sustainability com-
pared to their counterparts that do not opt for female representation. Thus, it is expected that 
women directors have positive effects also on the sustainability intensity of firms, intended as 
the level of sustainability they decide to pursue, and directly connected to the amount of invest-
ment companies decide to commit to satisfy responsible claims.  
Unfortunately, when considering the sustainability intensity of firms, women in corporate 
Boards do not show any impact in influencing the level of sustainability pursued, at least in the 
empirical context considered. This means that, despite female directors help the company to be 
sustainable, thus to get the B Corp Certification, they do not have enough power to leverage 
and to decide about the investment to finalize for satisfying in a better way the requirements of 
the Certification, thus for getting higher scores. Indeed, it seems that women directors drive 
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firms to behave sustainably, but do not lead corporations to invest more in ethical policies com-
pared to other B Corps.  
Conversely, when the woman is the Chief Executive Officer, results change. This discrepancy 
can be a consequence of the more influential role played by the CEO in the decision making 
process compared to Board members (Jiraporn et al. 2016): such higher power position of fe-
male allows them to influence more the investment decisions of the companies they guide, thus 
impacting the level of sustainability pursued by their firms. Similarly to Manner (2010), such 
dissertation highlights how sustainable performance are affected also by the CEO’s character-
istics, especially in terms of gender. Moreover, also Jiang & Akbar (2018) outlined how having 
a female as a CEO significantly increases corporate investments in sustainability, thus incorpo-
rating the sense of social responsibility in the company’s decision-making process.  
The last relevant aspect to outline is about the dimensions of sustainability that are positively 
influenced by the presence of female executive officers. Indeed, while no effects are shown on 
the environmental side of sustainability, the positive relation is exhibited between the gender 
of the CEO and the social edge of sustainability. Thus, female directors influence the invest-
ments level over the social and community matters, while neglecting – or while having a limited 
power over – the investments about environmental issues. Results are in line with previous 
researches (Galbreath 2011; Hussain, Rigoni & Orij 2018), which showed how women are pos-
itively associated to the social dimension of sustainability, but do not have any effects over the 
environmental one. There are several explanations of such phenomenon, the first linked to the 
difference in the career experiences between women and men: men are more expected to have 
education and experience connected to traditional masculine sector, as science and engineering 
(Singh, Terjesen & Vinnicombe 2008). Indeed, women are less likely to have business back-
grounds compared to men, therefore providing to companies expertise about how to interact 
with powerful group in the community rather than business perspectives (Hillman, Cannella 
and Harris 2002). Corporations thus perceive women as having less experience in environmen-
tal matters than men, discounting decisions from female executives, while favoring those from 
male ones (Galbreath 2011). Moreover, due to their traits and values, women attribute more 
importance on maintaining healthy community and society compared to man (Del Mar Alonso-
Almeida, Perramon & Bagur 2015), who are contrarily more engaged toward environmental 
matters.  
Despite the theoretical framework sustains such latter results, it’s worthwhile also to stress how 
female executives impact those sustainability areas that have lower visible returns for compa-
nies. Indeed, no effect from women CEOs has been reported on the environmental 
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sustainability, widely known as a fundamental element of corporate strategy, which often cor-
relates with superior economic performance and competitiveness (Esty & Charnovitz 2013). 
Quite the contrary, the main impacts of female CEOs have been reported over the social sus-
tainability, which is mainly connected to corporate reputation (Brammer & Pavelin 2006), more 
difficult to quantify in terms of economic returns. Indeed, reputation links with the positive 
image created pursuing social goals, which is then divulged to internal and external stakehold-
ers (Iwu-Egwuonwu 2011). As a matter of fact, the majority of previous researches have 
focused on environmental and economic sustainability, neglecting the social aspects (Dillard, 
Dujon and King 2009), given that many companies in order to be successful have preferred to 
focus on the environmental and economic edges of sustainability, being associated to higher 
profitability, competitiveness and productivity (Carter, Kale & Grimm 2000).  
On the basis of the results obtained, such research has allowed to validate and reinforce the 
discussions about the link between women representation and sustainability, highlighting how 
female directors, as well as female CEOs, positively affect different sides of Corporate Sustain-
ability. Indeed, while women directors positively influence the likelihood of a company to 
certify, female CEOs and their greater power position positively affect the level of social in-
vestments undertaken by firms.  
Despite results about the relation between the two phenomena are not univocal – both in the 
literature as well as in such study – the benefits brought by female representation and by the 
pursuing of ethical policies are widely recognized and accepted by modern corporations. There-
fore, sustainability and gender parity are no more seen as moral obligations toward the society, 
quite the contrary they represent two paths to be exploited in order to be successful and to 
outperform the competitive arena, a scenario in which is increasingly difficult to prosper and 
differentiate. 
 
5.2. Limitations and directions for future research 
The research performed in such dissertation is not immune from imperfections and restrictions. 
Such limits, already outlined in the previous paragraphs, can represent the starting point for 
further studies to be developed, aimed to provide a clearer and more complete overview over a 
topic that still needs additional clarifications. 
The main limitation of this study is due to the number of observations: from the initial sample 
of  313 B Corps and Benefit Corporations, only a narrow number of companies have partici-
pated to the survey. The problem of sample size can be solved enlarging the scope of the 
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analysis to other countries, thus collecting new responses from other foreign B Corps, or trying 
to expand the number of respondents of Italian and UK companies. The former solution may 
reduce also the bias connected to the limited number of countries included in the research: 
broadening the span of action to other countries may strengthen and support the idea that the 
link between women representation and sustainability is more positive when the country has 
higher gender parity, a statement which was not possible to confirm with such two-country 
analysis.  
Moreover, the outcomes of this research are limited to small and medium enterprises, given that 
only 6 firms of the overall sample can be classified as big corporations. This means that the 
results here obtained can be enforced only for SMEs, as the interpretation for bigger firms may 
yield to misleading conclusions. Similarly, enlarging the analysis also to bigger companies can 
prevent such misinterpretations to occur. 
Additionally, such findings cannot deny the reverse relation between women leadership and 
sustainability, specifically that firms with higher ethical performance are more likely to appoint 
and to attract women directors or women executive officers. Indeed, the corporations that con-
sider seriously their engagement in sustainability could be potentially those companies that are 
more likely to nominate women in their Boards. Unfortunately, this research cannot test the 
causality between the two phenomena, thus the burden to verify such relation is left to future 
studies that may investigate such possibility employing different and appropriate research 
methodologies.   
Further suggestions could be the selection of other Board and CEO characteristics, as some 
features that may influence the outcomes of the relation between women representation and 
sustainability have not been considered. Here, female representation on BoDs has been assessed 
considering simply the presence or absence of women into corporate Boards, without taking 
into account the number of female directors. Moreover, also the time since the director or the 
executive officer is appointed, even if not considered in this study, is expected to influence the 
link between female representation and sustainability. This happens because directors or CEOs 
that have longer careers have gained esteem and respect in years, thus translating into greater 
power position compared to peers with narrow courses. Thus, studies that control also for the 
strength of women representation and for the length of the charge of directors and executives 
may lead to more robust results.  
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To conclude, despite such research has allowed to confirm and strengthen the literature over 
the relation between women representation and sustainability, future studies can further con-
tribute to explore the conditions that influence such liaison and, more importantly, can validate 
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